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INTRODUCTION 
I N their thought-provoking contribution to this conference,1 Pro-fessors Ronald J. Allen and Brian Leiter address the state of 
evidence theory and purport to illustrate how it sometimes neglects 
developments in modern epistemology. They advance the thesis 
that "naturalized epistemology," and "in particular that branch of 
naturalized epistemology known as social epistemology," "provides 
the most appropriate theoretical framework for the study of evi-
dence."2 Actually, Allen and Leiter maintain that the approach of 
• Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology. 
1 Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of 
Evidence, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1491 (2001). 
2 ld. at 1493. 
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social epistemology explains what most evidence law scholars in 
fact do, "regardless of their explicit philosophical commitments,"3 a 
claim which I take to mean that most evidence scholars follow the 
general approach of modern naturalized epistemology, whether or 
not they are aware of that fact. If so, then such evidence scholars 
are admirably, if fortuitously, in tune with developments in modern 
philosophy. But problems arise, say Allen and Leiter, when we 
come to certain theoretically oriented evidence scholars who fail to 
recognize or to internalize appropriately the insights of social epis-
temology. 
Allen and Leiter quickly pass over the work of those evidence 
theorists most concerned with "postmodern" conceptions of truth 
and knowledge,' and so will I. Their principal targets, which they 
summarily characterize as those in search of an "algorithm" for de-
cisions at trial, are expected utility theory, Bayesian decision 
theory, and microeconomics.5 These theories seem to have the fol-
lowing elements in common: They are wide ranging in what they 
purport to explain or rationalize; they involve-at least in princi-
ple-quantification of probabilities and (sometimes) costs and 
benefits; and they are formal, in the sense that they attempt to 
model decisionmaking by simplifying the structure of the task at 
hand to a form that permits quantitative manipulation. The first of 
these features does not appear to be the culprit, for in the course of 
their paper, Allen and Leiter advance their own fairly comprehen-
sive theory of evidence law-the "relative plausibility" theory-
primarily a theory about burdens of proof but with claimed impli-
cations for the principles of admissibility as well.6 The real matters 
of concern appear to be the explicit quantification of probabilities 
and costs and, perhaps especially, the simplification of reality nec-
essary to utilize formal models. 
According to Allen and Leiter, algorithmic approaches-or at 
least the ones they criticize-neglect two important insights of 
naturalized epistemology.7 First, prescriptions generated by any 
useful theory of evidence should comply with a general constraint: 
3 Id. 
'Id. at 1492 & n.l. 
5 Id. at 1492-93. 
6 Id. at 1527-49. 
7 Id. at 1498. 
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"Ought implies can." "In other words, normative epistemology, 
like normative ethics, cannot require of agents actions (mental or 
physical) that they cannot perform. "8 Second, naturalized episte-
mology is instrumental: Cognitive procedures should be assessed in 
terms of how effective they are in producing knowledge. In the 
context of the design of rules governing trials, this means that such 
rules should require only those cognitive tasks that triers of fact, 
often lay jurors, are capable of performing, and that such rules 
should be assessed in terms of whether they produce true belief 
about the litigated facts,9 recognizing of course that some rules 
have a different purpose.10 
In what follows, I give Allen and Leiter a mixed review. I ap-
plaud their focus on naturalized epistemology, but I question the 
claims that they argue follow from it. In some ways, my reaction is 
that they have not gone far enough in pressing its implications, and 
I attempt to suggest how further progress might be made along this 
path. On the whole, I conclude that the antipathy toward algo-
rithms expressed by Allen and Leiter is misplaced. 
Part I will review the relationship between naturalized episte-
mology and what they refer to as "The Conceptual Foundations of 
Evidence. "11 I will argue that the implications of naturalized epis-
temology are not as supportive of a paternalistic attitude toward 
lay juries as Allen and Leiter appear to believe. Part II will discuss 
burdens of persuasion and the competing perspectives on such 
burdens provided by expected utility theory, which Allen and Le-
iter reject, and the relative plausibility theory, which they offer in 
its place. Here I will argue that Allen and Leiter's preferred theory 
is best understood as a tool that can be utilized under a decision 
criterion better informed by expected utility theory. Part III will 
address their criticisms of Bayesianism. I will reply that Bayesian 
thinking has a legitimate role to play as long as we do not expect 
too much of it. I will not consider separately what Allen and Leiter 
have to say about microeconomics as a tool for analysis of evi-
dence, because this part of their paper is singularly directed at 
Judge Richard Posner's interesting, but I think largely unproduc-
8 Id. at 1499. 
• Id. at 1499. 
10 Id. at 1500. 
11 Id. at 1499-1503. 
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tive, foray into the field of evidence,12 replicating many of the same 
issues addressed in connection with expected utility theory and 
Bayesianism.13 Along the way, however, I will address certain mat-
ters relating to Posner's arguments that shed light on the general 
issues considered. 
I. NATURALIZED EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE CONCEPTUAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 
Allen and Leiter argue that modern epistemology is heavily in-
fluenced by the idea that "philosophy should be continuous with a 
posteriori inquiry in the empirical sciences," that "philosophy can-
not be an exclusively a priori discipline. "14 Nowhere is this more 
plausible than in doing philosophical work about activities or en-
terprises aimed, at least in large part, at the creation of knowledge, 
such as science or trials in law courts. Naturalizing epistemology 
entails giving attention to the empirical study of knowledge creation. 
Social epistemology, in particular, is "that branch of naturalized epis-
temology concerned ... with the social processes and practices that 
inculcate belief. "15 In its normative or regulative dimension, social 
epistemology analyzes and evaluates social practices in terms of the 
objective of inculcating knowledge rather than ignorance, true 
rather than false beliefs.16 
This kind of normative social epistemology obviously resonates 
well with what evidence scholars have been doing for generations, 
analyzing rules of proof in terms of what Allen and Leiter, follow-
ing philosopher Alvin Goldman, would call their "veritistic" 
tendency-their tendency to generate true beliefs by decisionmak-
ers about disputed facts. 17 Moreover, it certainly encourages the 
evidence scholar to take seriously what empirical social science has 
to say that is relevant to the design of evidence rules. Allen and Le-
12 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1477 (1999). 
13 Economic analysis of evidence law in general, and Posner's arguments in 
particular, are considered at length in another paper presented at this conference. See 
Richard Lempert, The Economic Analysis of Evidence Law: Common Sense on Stilts, 
87 Va. L. Rev. 1619 (2001). 
14 Allen & Leiter, supra note 1, at 1494 (footnote omitted). 
15 Id. at 1497 (footnote omitted). 
16 Id. at 1498. 
'' Id. 
2001] Naturalized Epistemology 1555 
iter illustrate the benefits of doing so by discussing empirical work 
on the evaluation of witness demeanor,18 on the ability of jurors to 
understand the random match probability in DNA evidence cases,19 
and on the usefulness and prejudicial nature of character evi-
dence.20 While there has long been recognition of the importance of 
empirical work to evidence law and scholarship, there is an under-
standable reluctance among lawyers, most of whom have no 
scientific training, to dig into the details of empirical studies. Nev-
ertheless, in principle, there is no incompatibility here, and one can 
readily agree with Allen and Leiter's claim that "[f]or the· great 
bulk of evidentiary scholars ... this article merely solidifies the 
ground beneath their feet. ,m 
Significantly, Allen and Leiter maintain that endorsing the veri-
tistic framework of naturalized epistemology does not itself require 
them to take sides in the debate between 
those who advocate the "jury control principle" (the idea "that 
the organizing principle of Evidence law [is] a fear that lay ju-
rors [will] misuse certain types of evidence") and those who 
advocate "the best evidence principle" (the idea that "[t]he best 
evidence must be given of which the nature of the case per-
mits").22 
Both views, Allen and Leiter correctly point out, entail a com-
mitment to the design of veritistic institutions for the trial of 
disputes, specifically evidence rules. Still, the way Allen and Leiter 
express the debate is less than maximally illuminating in this con-
text; it compares apples with oranges by juxtaposing the "jury 
control principle" with the "best evidence principle." More illumi-
nating here would be to contrast the "worst evidence principle"-
the idea that evidence law seeks to prevent jury error by filtering 
out the really bad evidence that is likely to lead the jury astray but 
otherwise leaves the parties free to choose their proofs-with the 
"best evidence principle"-the idea that evidence law seeks, within 
the context of an adversarial trial, to assure that the best evidence 
18 ld. at 1539-42. 
19 Id. at 1542-45. 
20 Id. at 1546-49. 
21 ld. at 1493. 
21 
ld. at 1501 (footnotes omitted, alterations in original). 
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reasonably available to the parties is ultimately presented for the 
jury's use.23 Expressing the contras.t in this way reveals an impor-
tant difference between the two views: The worst evidence 
principle emphasizes jury control, while the best evidence principle 
emphasizes advocate control, which may be represented as follows: 
worst evidence 
principle 
.tt 
jury control 
principle 
versus 
versus 
best evidence 
principle 
.tt 
advocate control 
principle 
Why is this important? Despite their ostensible neutrality, Allen 
and Leiter assert that "[t]he jury control principle does, however, 
highlight an interesting feature of our evidentiary rules, namely, 
their epistemic patenialism. "24 This assertion warrants careful scru-
tiny. If their claim is that epistemic paternalism is significant to the 
extent that the jury control principle rightly interprets our eviden-
tiary rules, then I have no quarrel with what is claimed, only with 
what is thereby omitted. If, however, their point is to assert the 
dominance of epistemic paternalism as the rationale for our evi-
dentiary rules, then Allen and Leiter may indeed be taking sides.25 
23 Compare Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 Iowa L. Rev. 227 
{1988) (making the case for the best evidence principle), with Edward J. 
Imwinkelried, The Worst Evidence Principle: The Best Hypothesis as to the Logical 
Structure of Evidence Law, 46 U. Miami L. Rev. 1069 {1992) (suggesting that the 
common law of evidence focused on preventing witness perjury). Note that the worst 
evidence principle expressed in the text above is somewhat different from the 
principle by the same name expressed by Professor Imwinkelried, who focuses only 
on the prevention and detection of perjury and does not explicitly rely upon the 
tendency to deceive jurors as the source of the concern to suppress perjury. For those 
unfamiliar with this debate, emphasis on the worst evidence principle, as articulated 
here, traces back to the work of James Bradley Thayer in the late nineteenth century, 
while emphasis on the best evidence principle traces back through the work of 
Edmund Morgan in this century to several treatise writers of the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries. John Henry Wigmore, the ultimate veritistic evidence scholar, 
was ambivalent on the matter. Ample citations may be found in Nance, supra. 
24 Allen & Leiter, supra note 1, at 1502. 
25 Neither proponents of the jury control model nor proponents of the advocate 
control model maintain that their preferred perspective explains all evidence rules; 
everyone recognizes some scope for the opposing model. The differences are a matter 
of emphasis. Thus, it is not entirely clear from the passage quoted in the text or the 
rest of their paper whether Allen and Leiter do in fact take sides in this debate. 
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At the least, one would expect that they would also explore the 
contours of naturalized epistemology in the advocate control 
framework. The remainder of this Part addresses this matter. 
As Allen and Leiter describe it, "[e]pistemic paternalism substi-
tutes the rulemaker's judgment about what is epistemically best for 
the agents for their own judgment."26 To the extent that a given 
rule can and should be interpreted in terms of advocate control, it 
would be misleading to speak in these terms. An advocate control 
explanation views the judge as agent for the jury, able to use court-
room powers rightly centralized in the judge (for other practical 
reasons) to protect juries from the epistemic consequences of third-
parties' choices-namely, the choices of the advocates about what 
evidence to present and how to present it. In doing this, the judge 
need not assume any difference between his or her factual infer-
ences and those of a jury, given the same information. The rules 
allowing (and enforcing) pretrial discovery of evidence known to 
an opponent are straightforward and important examples.27 
It is true that the trial judge's judgment is always substituted for 
the judgment of the jury when it comes to the question of whether 
to admit evidence, but that is not necessarily the result of any sub-
stitution of judgment about what to infer about the merits of the 
case. Privilege rules are illustrative. We exclude evidence of privi-
leged communications not because of any substitution of the 
judge's assessment of what is epistemically best for the jury-that 
is, best relative to their factfinding task-but rather because of an-
cillary policies.28 More generally, the allocation of authority to the 
judge to exclude evidence is mostly a matter of administrative con-
venience and, of course, the superior legal knowledge of the judge. 
In those contexts governed by the advocate control principle, how-
ever, the judge's assessment about what evidence is practicably 
presentable is sometimes substituted for the jury's assessment of 
what is practicably presentable.29 To the extent that the latter con-
26 Id. at 1502 (quoting Brian Leiter, The Epistemology of Admissibility: Why Even 
Good Philosophy of Science Would Not Make for Good Philosophy of Evidence, 
1997 BYU L. Rev. 803, 814-15). 
27 E.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. 
28 Graham C. Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence § 9.1, at 437 (3d ed. 
1996). 
29 For example, some substitution may be required to assess whether a hearsay 
declarant incarcerated in another state is practicably presentable by the prosecution; 
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sideration is involved, there is an element of paternalism in placing 
this authority in the judge rather than the jury. Its reason is epis-
temic in that it relates to evidence, but it is not purely epistemic-it 
involves a heavy dose of policy-and it is otherwise quite distinct 
from the kind of paternalism generated by a differential assessment 
of evidence admitted on the merits of the case. 
The point can be made more precise with the following formal 
representation.30 Any veritistic approach to admissibility presup-
poses that one can, always in principle and sometimes in practice, 
associate with each alternative evidence package that a jury might 
consider in a case a measure or ranking of the probable accuracy of 
thejury's verdict. Let V(x) represent this association. Let E be the 
set of all evidence admitted or to be admitted, not including evi-
dence Eo (for the "offered" item of evidence), the admissibility of 
which is in question. Under the worst evidence principle, and its as-
sociated jury control model, the evidence Eo should be excluded if 
the legal system believes31 that 
(Taint Criterion) V(E) > V(E and Eo). 
In many applications, this criterion is paternalistic in the epis-
temic sense characterized by Allen and Leiter. If the legal system 
believes this inequality holds, it may be because officials within the 
legal system believe the jury will be unable to ignore or adjust for 
the truth-distorting effects of Eo, effects that by hypothesis must be 
better understood by those who would exclude Eo from the jury's 
these are matters that the judge likely understands better than the jury. Cf. Barber v. 
Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968) (holding that a witness is not "unavailable" unless the 
prosecution makes a good faith effort to obtain him for trial). It generally does not 
take much substitution of judgment, however, to appreciate that cross-examinable 
testimony is superior and reasonably presentable, as compared to testimony by a 
witness who would prefer not to be subject to cross-examination. See Nance, supra 
note 23, at 282. 
30 Presumably, this is a use of formalism to which even Allen and Leiter would not 
object. 
31 The expression "the legal system believes" and similar expressions are intended to 
prescind questions of allocation of exclusionary authority among trial courts, 
appellate courts, and legislatures. The belief in question may be that of the trial judge 
acting within appropriate discretion as to a particular case, or that of a rulemaking 
body acting with regard to a general class of cases into which E. falls. 
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consideration.32 In other applications however, the veritistic im-
provement attributable to excluding Eo when the Taint Criterion is 
satisfied can result from non-paternalistic factors, factors that 
would warrant exclusion even if those officials making the assess-
ment under the criterion were also the triers of fact.33 
Under the best evidence principle and its associated advocate 
control model, the evidence Eo should be excluded not only in the 
latter context-when excluding "tainted" evidence does not entail 
endorsing a seriously paternalistic attitude toward jurors34-but 
also when the law believes that there exists alternative evidence 
not within £-call it E.-that the proponent could, and likely will, 
present if Eo is excluded and 
(Inducement Criterion) V(E and E.) > V(E and £.).35 
In such cases, the law excludes the evidence Eo not because the 
jury will be unable to discount Eo appropriately but rather because 
it should not have to decide the case without the benefit of the bet-
ter evidence, E •. That is, under this theory, exclusion would be 
warranted even if it were also true that V(E and E.) > V(E), in 
other words, even if Eo would not be excluded under the Taint Cri-
terion. Conversely, if Eo is relevant, exclusion ordinarily would not 
32 For example, if E. is hearsay, it might be thought that the jury would be unable to 
account for the epistemic hearsay dangers, such as the fact that the original declarant 
did not speak under oath subject to cross-examination (assuming that is the-case), 
dangers known to the legal system and for which more knowledgeable individuals (for 
example, those with legal training) could malce appropriate discounts. 
33 The conspicuous example is excluding evidence that is irrelevant or of such little 
probative value as to be a waste of time. See Fed. R. Evid. 402-03. Regardless of the 
level of epistemic competency of the trier of fact, there is something to be gained by 
being able to focus cognitive energy on evidence that is of significant probative value. 
The best evidence principle, at least as I have developed it, allows for taint-based 
exclusions of this kind. Nance, supra note 23, at 270-74. 
34 As I have elaborated it, the best evidence principle does not endorse the exclusion 
of evidence simply because of a belief that the jury will not understand the evidence 
or will use it in a flawed manner. For a discussion of these issues, see Nance, supra 
note 23, at 271. 
35 Here also, the probabilistic assessment of whether the proponent will introduce 
the alternative evidence may be one regarding the particular case or one regarding a 
class of cases of which the present case is an example. 
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be warranted if no such alternative evidence (E.) could be identi-
fied.36 
What is striking about the difference between these two veritistic 
admissibility criteria is that the Taint Criterion seeks to shield from 
the jury evidence that the jury is thought incapable of handling to 
good effect. By contrast, the Inducement Criterion excludes evi-
dence only to improve the total evidentiary package by motivating 
a party to introduce evidence that would otherwise be omitted or 
that, if the alternative evidence is likely to be introduced by the 
opponent anyway, would not thereby be introduced in the most 
convenient way for the jury's use. The latter theory will rarely be 
paternalistic in any strong sense because it typically reflects the 
law's belief that any rational decisionmaker, whether lay jury or 
experienced trial judge, would benefit from the superior evidence 
presentation. 37 The difference between these two ideas is clearly re-
flected, but also underutilized, in the philosophical literature on 
epistemic paternalism upon which Allen and Leiter presumably 
draw.38 
36 For example, if E. is otherwise admissible testimony concerning the contents of a 
document, exclusion of such testimony for failure to introduce the original 
document-here the E.-only makes sense when it is practical for the proponent to 
introduce the original; otherwise, the decisionmaker benefits from having at least 
secondary evidence of the contents (E.) the probative value of which must be duly 
discounted. Of course, this specification fits the pattern of practice actually 
encountered under the so-called "original document rule" much better than the Taint 
Criterion. See Fed. R. Evict. 1001-08. 
37 Whether a particular exclusionary rule should be understood, and potentially 
reformed, under a Taint Criterion model or an Inducement Criterion model is often a 
challenging question. See, e.g., Nance, supra note 23, at 274-94 (arguing that the 
Inducement Criterion model better explains many of the rules). The hearsay rule is 
particularly interesting and important in this regard. See id. at 281-83 (arguing that 
while hearsay rules have often been understood under a "jury distrust" model and 
possess some features reflecting that fact, they are actually better interpreted as an 
application of the "best evidence" principle); see also George F. James, The Role of 
Hearsay in a Rational Scheme of Evidence, 34 Ill. L. Rev. 788, 791-97 (1940) (arguing 
that the "best evidence" idea is the only proper ground for the exclusion of hearsay); 
Michael L. Seigel, Rationalizing Hearsay: A Proposal for a Best Evidence Hearsay 
Rule, 72 B.U. L. Rev. 893 (1992) (articulating steps to reform the hearsay rule in 
accordance with the best evidence principle). 
38 See Alvin I. Goldman, Episternic Paternalism: Communication Control in Law 
and Society, 88 J. Phil. 113 (1991), reprinted in Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the 
Cognitive and Social Sciences 209 (1992). When addressing the exclusion of evidence 
from trials at law, Professor Goldman speaks only in terms corresponding to the taint 
criterion. Id. at 209-15. Later, when addressing Federal Trade Commission remedies 
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With these points in mind, we can better assess the significance 
of Allen and Leiter's warning that the epistemic paternalism of the 
jury control model, if it is to be done well, requires attention not 
only to the epistemic shortcomings of jurors but also to the epis-
temic shortcomings of the judges who must apply any rules 
designed to deal with the former.39 This too can be granted without 
taking sides in the dispute over the relative merits of jury control 
and advocate control. Indeed, this same distinction, between what 
Allen and Leiter call "primary epistemic rules" and what they call 
"secondary epistemic rules,"40 also applies in the context of advo-
cate control explanations of evidence rules. Had Allen and Leiter 
explored this alternative path of analysis, they might have reached 
a conclusion more supportive of the advocate control view. 
Most importantly, policymakers who write rules of evidence and 
judges who must apply them (both overwhelmingly lawyers) are by 
training quite familiar with what lawyers do in thinking about how 
to prepare and present a case. By contrast, lawyers are perhaps too 
professionalized to empathize effectively with the situation of lay 
jurors. Indeed, empirical studies conducted in recent decades have 
shown that many of the rather condescending assertions lawyers 
have been making regularly for decades, indeed for centuries, 
about how jurors react to evidence are false, or at least considera-
bly off-target.41 Put simply, we lawyers-including judges-know a 
for deceptive advertisements, he recognizes that in corrective advertising "communication 
control sometimes takes a stronger form than the one considered thus far: not excluding 
messages, but mandating messages of a specified kind or content." ld. at 216. Of 
course, the two can be combined, as when the point of excluding a message is to 
encourage an alternative one, and this is the pattern often seen in the law of evidence. 
39 Allen & Leiter, supra note 1, at 1502. 
40 I d. 
41 One illustration is documented in a paper presented at this conference. Shari 
Seidman Diamond & Neal Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden Topics, 87 
Va. L. Rev. 1857, at 1875-95 (2001) (reporting the results of a study of actual jury 
deliberations indicating that jurors in tort cases who discuss the forbidden topic of 
insurance almost invariably discuss not the deep pockets of the insured defendant-so 
feared by lawyers as to have generated a codified response, Federal Rule 411-but 
rather the risk of double recovery by the insured plaintiff). There are many other such 
examples in the literature, including the accumulating empirical evidence that jurors 
are not overly impressed by hearsay evidence despite the persistent fears of lawyers 
that are offered to explain the hearsay rule. See, e.g., Peter Miene et al., Juror 
Decision Making and the Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 683,686-
87 (1992); Richard F. Rakos & Stephan Landsman, Researching the Hearsay Rule: 
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lot more about what lawyers do and why they do it than we know 
about what juries do and why they do it. Thus, the factual assump-
tions used by judges and other policymakers in order to substitute 
their own judgments about inferences from evidence for those of 
juries are inherently less reliable than the experiential basis they 
use to substitute their judgments for those of advocates as to the 
presentation of evidence. 
Such comparative institutional competency should be important 
to theorists who rightly emphasize the principle that "ought implies 
can. "42 It provides a strong reason to believe that rules designed to 
prevent or offset the accuracy-jeopardizing choices of advocates 
are more likely to yield veritistic fruit than are rules designed to 
prevent or offset jury error that might arise from lay jurors' epis-
. temic incompetence. At least, this will be true until and unless 
particular suspicions about such jurors' epistemic deficiencies are 
confirmed by empirical research. Except to the extent that such de-
ficiencies can be empirically confirmed, admissibility rules and 
other rules of trial procedure should be focused on empathetically 
assisting jurors to perform the difficult inferential task that they are 
assigned rather than on paternalistically suppressing information 
that lay people are thought incapable of using properly. 
It is hard to discern from what Allen and Leiter have written 
whether correcting for these sins of omission (failure to explore the 
comparative ability of jurists to effectuate jury control and advocate 
control) and commission (overemphasis of epistemic paternalism) 
would dramatically affect the research program that they suggest. 
The preceding discussion may be simply an in-house quibble 
among similarly inclined theorists. Nonetheless, it is interesting to 
speculate about the source of the apparent confusion. The explana-
tion may lie in a continuing tendency to associate the jury control 
idea with the design of exclusionary rules and to associate the ad-
vocate control idea only with the choice between an adversarial 
and a comparatively inquisitorial system of procedure, as if the ad-
vocate control principle drops out of the mix of consideration once 
the choice is made to use an adversarial system with (limited) rules 
Emerging Findings, General Issues and Future Directions, 76 Minn. Rev. 65 (1992) 
(reporting results of mock jury experiments). 
"See Allen & Leiter, supra note 1, at 1499 (quoting Alvin I. Goldman, Epistemics: 
The Regulative Theory of Cognition, 75 J. Phil. 509, 510 (1978)). 
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of pretrial discovery.43 These unfortunate tendencies persist, even 
among those who clearly understand the importance of lawyer 
preparation and presentation of evidence to the development of 
the common-law exclusionary rules.44 Perhaps the present discus-
sion will help dissolve these entrenched associations. In an era of 
continuing assaults on the institution of the jury, however, I think it 
is unlikely to do so unless we free ourselves from the unhelpful 
connotations, if not the logical confines, of an emphasis on "epis-
temic paternalism." 
II. EXPECIED UTILITY, RELATIVE PLAUSIBILITY, AND THE 
BURDEN OF PERSUASION 
The setting of the burden of persuasion for a given case allocates 
the risks of error that remain after all the admitted evidence is con-
sidered. Expected utility theory has been applied to explain and to 
prescribe the criterion of decision if the expected costs associated 
43 Such tendencies appear, for example, in the work of philosopher Alvin Goldman, 
upon whom Allen and Leiter rely. See Alvin I. Goldman, Knowledge in a Social 
World §§ 9.4-9.7, at 289-304 (1999) (discussing jury control in assessing the veritistic 
quality of exclusionary rules and discussing lawyer control in assessing the 
comparative veritism of common-law and civil-law systems of adjudication and the 
design of discovery rules within the former). To be sure, Goldman correctly 
recognizes that controlling lawyers' strategic impulses remains an important goal in 
the adversarial context when formulating rules about expert witnesses. See id. § 9.8, at 
304-11. But with regard to the "large class of 'exclusionary' rules" that distinguishes 
the common-law system, he makes the now rather remarkable assertion that "[t]his 
peculiarity of the common-law system is worth examining, although it has no obvious 
relationship to the adversarial character of that system." Id. at 291. While the 
relationship may not have been obvious at one time, it has been amply demonstrated, 
see sources cited supra note 23, and is a fact well understood by writers upon whom 
Goldman himself relies. See Goldman, supra, at 290 (citing Mirjan R. Damaska, 
Evidence Law Adrift (1997)). Darnaska's book begins by noting the competition 
between jury control and advocate control ideas in regard to the explanation of 
exclusionary rules. Darnaska, supra, at 1-2. 
44 Compare John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 263, 300--06 (1978) (observing that evidentiary rules were scarce before lawyers 
began presenting evidence), and John H. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century 
Criminal Trial: A View from the Ryder Sources, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 123-34 (1983) 
(describing how exclusionary rules developed when lawyers began presenting 
evidence), with John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 823, 829 (1985) (making the passing comment that the bulk of the 
exclusionary rules are employed out of a fear of the lay jury's inability to evaluate 
evidence "purposively"). 
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with these risks of error are to be minimized. 45 "Costs" in this con-
text need not be limited to economic costs in any narrow sense but 
rather include any negative consequences of erroneous decisions. 
In cases where a binary choice is presented-guilty or not guilty, 
liable or not liable-the risks of error are of two kinds. There is the 
risk of a false positive result, such as convicting the innocent, and 
the risk of a false negative result, such as acquitting the guilty. If we 
let P( G) represent the probability that the truth is such that defen-
dant is guilty (or liable), D( +) the disutility of a false positive, and 
D(-) the disutility of a false negative, then the standard result of 
expected utility theory is that verdict should be given for the prose-
cution (or plaintiff) if and only if: 
1 
P(G) > 46 
1 + D(-)!D( +) 
We should pause to note, in view of the frequent confusion on 
the matter, that this result does not require the use of Bayes' Theo-
rem, which relates to the question of how to assess P( G). 47 The 
minimization of expected error costs using such a criterion does 
not depend on how the decisionmaker arrives at P( G), so long as 
the assessment is a tolerably accurate expression of the decision-
maker's degree of certainty about the issue after a rational 
consideration of the admissible evidence, a condition that must be 
satisfied under any plausible theory of the burden of persuasion.48 
45 Goals other than cost minimization are also possible within a similarly formalized 
framework, but error cost minimization is the target of Allen and Leiter's critique. 
See Allen & Leiter, supra note 1, at 1503-D6. 
46 See, e.g., John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1065, 1071-74 (1968). For a more general derivation of the decision criterion 
that takes into account the possibilities of non-zero and unequal utilities for true 
positives and true negatives, see Dale A. Nance, Evidential Completeness and the 
Burden of Proof, 49 Hastings L.J. 621,622-24 (1998). 
47 For a discussion of the role of Bayes' Theorem, see infra Part III. 
48 It is often asserted but never demonstrated that using such a decision criterion 
presupposes perfectly rational decisionmakers properly using Bayes' Theorem to 
revise a perfectly informed prior probability. See, e.g., Richard S. Bell, Decision 
Theory and Due Process: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Lawmaking for Burdens 
of Proof, 78 J. of Crim. L. & Criminology 557, 563-69 (1987). While such conditions 
would suffice to assure results in accordance with the policy goals reflected in the 
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Allen and Leiter correctly summarize the implications of this 
formula: 
In a case involving a binary choice where the disutilities of 
wrongful verdicts [that is, false positives and false negatives] are 
equal, decision should be for whomever the probabilities favor. 
This is the 0.5 rule of civil litigation .... If disutilities of wrong-
ful decisions are not equal, as in criminal cases where a 
wrongful conviction is considerably worse than a wrongful ac-
quittal, the decision rule is adjusted to accommodate the 
difference.49 
Allen and Leiter then refer to a number of arguments, ostensibly 
grounded in veritistic social epistemology, against this way of ex-
plaining or prescribing burdens of persuasion. 5° I cannot address all 
of them here, but I will address enough to demonstrate where I 
think the alternative approach recommended by Allen and Leiter 
has value and where I think it falters. 51 
decision criterion, there is no reason to assume that they are necessary conditions-in 
other words, to assume that those goals cannot be achieved to an acceptable degree 
with more realistic assumptions about how jurors process information to arrive at 
P(G). 
49 Allen & Leiter, supra note 1, at 1504. Omitted by the ellipsis is this statement: "In 
cases involving more than two possible explanations, decision should be for the most 
probable (and here we see the first problem, for this is not the law)." I d._ This 
misstates results in the work of decision theorists, the probable explanation of which 
is noted below. See infra notes 82, 110, and accompanying text. 
50 Allen & Leiter, supra note 1, at 1504-06. There is a noticeable irony here: 
Professor Goldman, Allen and Leiter's chief exemplar of modem social epistemology, 
himself relies on the core insight of expected utility-its emphasis on the comparative 
utility of false positives and false negatives-in explaining the burden of persuasion. 
See id. at 1494 & n.9; Goldman, supra note 43, at 284. 
51 In particular, Allen and Leiter mention briefly a set of issues concerning how to 
account for "base rates," how to conceive of the relationship between policy makers 
who set the burden of persuasion and judges and juries who apply them, and how to 
account for problems in the accuracy of probability assessments. See Allen & Leiter, 
supra note 1, at 1505-06. Space does not permit adequate treatment of these issues 
here; fortunately, they are carefully analyzed in an article published elsewhere by a 
defender of expected utility theory. D.H. Kaye, Clarifying the Burden of Persuasion: 
What Bayesian Decision Rules Do and Do Not Do, 3 Int'l J. of Evidence & Proof 1 
(1999). 
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In place of the expected utility approach, they recommend the 
"relative plausibility theory" ,52 summarized as follows: 
The critical insight of the relative plausibility theory is that legal 
factfinding involves a determination of the comparative plausibil-
ity of the parties' explanations offered at trial rather than a 
determination of whether discrete elements are found to a spe-
cific probability. In civil cases the factfinder is to identify the 
most plausible account of the relevant events, whereas in crimi-
nal cases the prosecution must provide a plausible account of 
guilt and show that there is no plausible account of innocence.53 
The relative plausibility idea appears to stand in contrast to the ex-
pected utility approach, but the quoted summary reveals something 
else, a third approach: Determine whether each "element" of the 
cause of action in question is found to a specific probability and 
decide for the party with the burden of proof if and only if each of 
the elements is so found. This approach looks only to the proof of 
elements of a cause of action or affirmative defense. It is the kind 
of decision rule Allen and Leiter claim is used by the courts.54 To 
sort this out, we must consider the relationship of such elements to 
the problem of proof. 
A. Elements and the Burden of Proof 
Every cause of action can be broken down into various compo-
nents, often called its elements. This breakdown is not unique but 
serves only to focus attention on particular aspects of the cause of 
action as a whole. For example, a cause of action for negligence 
may be broken down into two elements: (A) breach of duty and 
(B) compensable injury proximately caused by that breach. Alter-
natively, one can break the same cause of action down into four 
elements: (W) existence of a duty; (X) breach of that duty; (Y) exis-
tence of compensable injury; and ( Z) a proximate causal connection 
between the breach and the injury. The choice of the number of ele-
ments does not affect what must be proved to prevail on the cause of 
52 This theory was first presented by Allen some fifteen years ago. See Ronald J. 
Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U. L. Rev. 401,425-31 (1986). 
53 Allen & Leiter, supra note 1, at 1527-28. 
54 Id. at 1504. 
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action so long as each articulation is true to the substantive law.55 
Assuming away doubts about the facts-that is, assuming one 
knows the facts with certainty-the plaintiff should prevail if and 
only if each element is present. Deductively, using a two element 
breakdown with A and B representing the elements, the conjunc-
tive event {A and B} is true if and only if A is true and B is true, 
which is true if and only if {W and X and Y and Z} is true, and so 
forth. 
But when one takes account of the problem that the truth about 
litigated facts is almost never known with certainty, things get more 
complicated. In the context of a simple case with no affirmative de-
fenses or alternative claims, the plaintiff should win if and only if 
all elements of the plaintiff's single cause of action have been ade-
quately proved (without specifying for now what "adequately 
proved" means). Unfortunately, that cannot be easily translated 
into a series of statements about the individual elements. One 
might try to say, using two elements again, that the conjunctive 
proposition {A and B} is proved to sufficient certainty if and only if 
A is proved to sufficient certainty and B is proved to sufficient cer-
tainty. Unless one abandons the traditional axiomatic rules of 
probability theory, however, the measure of what is "sufficient" in 
the proof of the conjunctive event {A and B} will not be the same 
as the measure of what is "sufficient" in the proof of A and of B 
taken serially, as Allen and Leiter observe.56 
55 To be sure, it might have psychological effects on a jury that are not logically 
warranted. 
56 See Allen & Leiter, supra note 1, at 1504. This is the supposed paradox of 
conjunction: Just because P(A) > p and P(B) > p, one cannot infer that P(A and B)> 
p. For example, if P(A) = 0.6 > 0.5, P(B) = 0.6 > 0.5, and P(BIA) = 0.7, then P(A and 
B)= P(A) x P(BIA) = 0.42 < 0.5. 
1568 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 87:1551 
To obtain needed precision, let us restate the three theories, as 
applied in the context of a civil case with a single cause of action, 
two elements A and B, and no affirmative defenses, using P(X) to 
mean the probability that X is true and using the conventional "iff" 
to mean "if and only if." Under the expected utility theory, if the 
disutility of a false positive is equal to the disutility of a false nega-
tive, the decision criterionis: 
Criterion 1: 
(expected utility) 
Plaintiff wins iff 
P(A and B) > 0.5 
So that this criterion cannot be bested by competitors merely on 
the ground that it involves explicit quantification, which might be 
thought antithetical to law or at least to the ability of jurors to 
comprehend instructions, a mathematically equivalent expression 
that does not require the computation of a number is: 
Criterion 1: 
(alternative form) 
Plaintiff wins iff 
P(A and B)> P(not (A and B)) 
This criterion prescribes a plaintiff victory if the conjunctive propo-
sition {A and B} is more probable than not. 
Those familiar with probability theory will know that, tautologi-
cally, P(A and B) = P(A) x P(BIA). In the event that A and Bare 
stochastically independent, this equation reduces to P(A and B) = 
P(A) x P(B). It is important to emphasize, however, that nothing 
about expected utility theory requires the factfinder in a lawsuit to 
assess the probability of the conjunctive event by using these 
multiplicative properties after independently assessing P(A) and 
P(B) (or, in a case of stochastic dependence, P(BIA)). Although 
reference to these properties may be useful in particular trial con-
texts, the factfinder ordinarily will and presumably should use 
whatever heuristic devices are suitable or familiar for the type of 
inferences involved in the trial.57 
57 Some of the criticisms of expected utility theory that one encounters in the 
literature fail to acknowledge this point, and a similar failure may motivate Allen and 
Leiter in their rejection of expected utility theory as among those "algorithmic" 
approaches that factfinders are practically incapable of using. For a discussion of the 
use of the probability calculus in thinking about P( G), see infra Part III. Of course, 
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The relative plausibility theory as advanced by Allen and Leiter 
is more difficult to state explicitly in comparable terms, owing to 
ambiguities in the way they have expressed it. One source of ambi-
guity is the use of the term "plausibility" instead of "probability." 
This requires one to assess in what respect those terms are differ-
ent, but Allen and Leiter are silent on this point. From earlier work 
by Allen, it is clear that plausibility is in part a matter of probabil-
ity, but the relationship is unclear.58 In the rest of their paper, Allen 
and Leiter consistently use comparative probabilities as an index to 
comparative plausibilities, and so, therefore, will 1.59 With this ca-
veat, the criterion seems to be: · 
Criterion 2: 
(relative plausibility) 
Plaintiff wins iff 
P(plaintiff's story)> P(defendant's story) 
Allen and Leiter make much of the "comparative" nature of ju-
ridical factfinding and its coherence with the relative plausibility 
theory, but alternative Criterion 1 is just as "comparative" as the 
relative plausibility theory. The difference is just that the probabili-
ties being compared are not the same under the two theories. The 
other principal advantages Allen and Leiter claim for Criterion 2 
flow from the fact that the jurors need not attempt to search over 
all possible stories that would explain the evidence-which may in-
deed seem like an impossible task-but rather can limit their 
consideration to the stories (or explanations) advanced by the par-
the veritistic tendencies of commonly applied heuristics are much debated. Compare 
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, in Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Daniel Kahneman et 
al. eds., 1982) (presenting a relatively pessimistic assessment), with Gerd Gigerenzer 
et al., Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart (1999) (presenting a more optimistic 
assessment). 
58 Allen has written that: "What makes stories plausible seems to be determined by 
such variables as coherence, consistency, completeness, uniqueness, economy, and 
(yes) probability." Ronald J. Allen, Rationality, Algorithms and Juridical Proof: A 
Preliminary Inquiry, 1 Int'l J. Evidence & Proof 254, 274 (1997). One would think, for 
example, that a more complete, coherent, consistent, and economical story is a more 
probable story, but Allen's explication does not clearly indicate the relationship. 
59 If it is not true that any differences in the plausibility of the contending stories is 
reflected in their comparative probabilities, then the arguments that follow with 
regard to the relative plausibility theory are more complicated; I think, however, they 
remain essentially correct. 
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ties.60 The idea, explained more fully in an earlier article by Allen, 
is that the judge would check the story advanced by each party to 
assure that, if true, it would require a judgment for the offering 
party under the substantive law. Only if both parties advance such 
stories is a trial necessary, with the jury instructed simply to decide 
in favor of the party whose story is more plausible.61 
Finally, Allen and Leiter claim that under prevailing legal doc-
trine, the decision criterion is that the plaintiff should win if and 
only if each element of the cause of action is proved, seriatim, by a 
preponderance of the evidence:62 
Criterion 3: 
("elements" approach) 
Plaintiff wins iff 
P(A) > 0.5 and P(B) > 0.5 
Obviously, this criterion assumes that the civil standard is "more 
probable than not," either nominally or as an interpretation of the 
phrase "preponderance of the evidence. "63 Again, to avoid the red 
herring of explicit quantification, the criterion can be restated in 
the following non-numerical, comparative! form: 
Plaintiff wins iff Criterion 3: 
(alternative form) P(A) > P(not-A) and P(B) > P(not-B) 
With these criteria expressly articulated, one can restate the Al-
len and Leiter thesis as follows: Both the expected utility theory 
and the relative plausibility theory diverge from extant doctrine, 
which is represented by Criterion 3. Extant doctrine is wrong-
headed for many reasons, and, again for many reasons, the relative 
plausibility theory (Criterion 2) is better than the expected utility 
theory (Criterion 1) as an alternative to extant doctrine.64 For con-
venience, it is appropriate to summarize here the response that is 
detailed in the following sections. First, there is in fact very little 
60 Allen & Leiter, supra note 1, at 1527-28. 
61 Ronald J. Allen, The Nature of Juridical Proof, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 373, 406-13 
(1991). 
62 Allen & Leiter, supra note 1, at 1504. 
63 See Allen, supra note 52, at 405. 
64 Allen & Leiter, supra note 1, at 1528 (enumerating the purported advantages of 
the relative plausibility theory). 
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difference, if any, between Criterion 1 and prevailing legal doc-
trine. Second, Criterion 1 is superior to Criterion 2. Nevertheless, 
Criterion 2 serves as a useful reference point for the jury in reach-
ing a decision under Criterion 1.65 
B. Legal Doctrine and The Prescriptions of Expected Utility Theory 
There are certainly good reasons to believe that extant doctrine 
would be wrongheaded if it were as stated in Criterion 3. In par-
ticular, as Allen and Leiter note, such a rule does not minimize 
expected error costs, and it appears to favor plaintiffs systematically 
by prescribing plaintiff verdicts in cases where P(A and B) < 0.5.66 In 
my judgment, however, there is no well-established legal doctrine 
endorsing Criterion 3 over Criterion 1. The claim that there is such 
a legal doctrine is most frequently justified-to the extent that it is 
justified at all-by reference to sample jury instructions. 57 In 1986, I 
reported my own modest search of authorities and concluded that 
65 While Allen and Leiter clearly offer the relative plausibility theory as a normative 
model of decision (one at variance with the prevailing proof rules), they also refer to 
evidence in the rules and practices of courts as showing that their theory is a more 
"accurate" description of practice, id. at 1537, which makes it appear that their theory 
is a descriptive one. Perhaps, therefore, Allen and Leiter are trying to bridge the 
prescriptive/descriptive gap by offering an "interpretation" of practice with both 
descriptive and prescriptive components, although they never explicitly say that. If so 
understood, their claim is simply that, all things considered, Criterion 2 is a better 
interpretation of prevailing practices than is Criterion 1, proof rules notwithstanding. 
My reply is that Criterion 1 is a better interpretation of proof rules, even though 
Criterion 2 may be a useful aid to inferential practices within the framework of such 
rules. 
66 Allen & Leiter, supra note 1, at 1504. I set aside various attempts to explain why, 
as a matter of pragmatic accommodation or in recognition of the dynamics of group 
decisionmaking, using Criterion 3 in practice might better effectuate decisions that 
actually satisfy Criterion 1 or other considerations of public policy. E.g., Saul 
Levmore, Conjunction and Aggregation, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 723 (2001); Alex Stein, Of 
Two Wrongs That Make a Right: Two Paradoxes of the Evidence Law and Their 
Combined Economic Justification, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 1199 (2001). 
67 See infra note 72. The claim appears to have originated with Jonathan Cohen, a 
British philosopher, who used it as part of an argument that legal probabilities do not 
follow the same rules as the probabilities commonly used in science, statistics, 
decision theory, and so forth. See L. Jonathan Cohen, The Probable and the Provable 
58-59 (1977) (stating that "[t]he rule for civil suits requires a plaintiff to prove each 
~lement of his case on the balance of probability," and that the conjunction rule, with 
Jts multiplicative consequence under mathematical probabilities, "seems to be a rule 
that is unknown to judges and unrespected by triers of fact"). He provided neither 
legal authority nor empirical evidence in support of these claims. 
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standard form jury instructions are usually ambiguous, if not hope-
lessly confused, on the point.68 To my knowledge, no significant 
legal research since that time has contradicted my conclusion,69 al-
though a number of scholars, including Allen and Leiter, continue 
to argue from the premise that the law endorses Criterion 3.70 
In my 1986 article, I also reported a plausible explanation for the 
confusion that appears in the jury instructions.71 Suppose that Cri-
terion 1 is the test that jurists are clumsily trying to articulate. In 
that case, it is not surprising that some instructions include state-
ments such as, "In order to prevail, the plaintiff must prove every 
element of his case by a preponderance of the evidence. "72 Even if 
we construe clauses such as "every element" as denoting a serial 
consideration of the elements against that standard of proof (which 
of course is not unavoidable), such instructions are straightfor-
wardly consistent with Criterion 1. For example, if P(A) < 0.5, then 
necessarily P(A and B) < 0.5, and the plaintiff has failed to prove 
his case. Consequently, if the jury finds that P(A) < 0.5, then it 
need not go on to consider evidence related to element B. This ef-
fects a savings of time and energy for the jury.73 A serial focus on 
elements is thus entirely natural and desirable under the expected 
utility theory. We can incorporate this point directly into the ex-
68 See Dale A. Nance, A Comment on the Supposed Paradoxes of a Mathematical 
Interpretation of the Logic of Trials, 66 B.U. L. Rev. 947 (1986). 
69 In a recent article, Saul Levmore collects some additional jury instructions and 
reaches essentially the same conclusion that I did in 1986: that they are varied and 
often ambiguous in the answer that they give to the question of whether the law 
employs Criterion 1 or Criterion 3. Levmore, supra note 66, at 724 n.l. 
70 Allen & Leiter, supra note 1, at 1504. For theorists who express strong objection 
to "rootless theorizing" based on inaccurate doctrinal assumptions, this is no small 
difficulty. Cf. id. at 1521-27 (criticizing Posner's analyses as "rootless" in that, inter 
alia, they proceed from false assumptions about the state of evidence doctrine). 
71 Nance, supra note 68, at 949-52. 
72 Typical is the jury instruction relied upon by Allen, supra note 52, at 405 n.19: 
The burden is on the plaintiff in a civil action, such as this, to prove every 
essential element of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. If the proof 
should fail to establish any essential element of plaintiff's claim by a 
preponderance of the evidence in the case, the jury should find for the 
defendant. 
E. Devitt & C. Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions§ 71.14 (3d ed. 1977). 
73 For this purpose it is not necessary that jurors understand that if P(A) < 0.5, then 
necessarily P(A and B) < 0.5. 
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plicit decision criterion by restating Criterion 1 in the following 
logically equivalent form: 
Criterion 1: 
(augmented) 
Plaintiff wins iff 
P(A and B)> P(not (A and B)), and 
P(A) > P(not-A), and P(B) > P(not-B) 
This, it seems to me, is a formal expression of what courts are often 
trying to articulate, sometimes quite successfully.74 
To be sure, a real potential for conflict with Criterion 1 can arise 
if the jury is instructed, in effect, with the converse of the above in-
struction: "Plaintiff prevails if the plaintiff proves each element of 
his case by a preponderance of the evidence." It is easy to see how 
lawyers and judges, betrayed by their lack of sophistication in how 
probabilities work, might slide into the latter element-by-element 
instruction from the former, even though the two formulations are 
not logically equivalent. If the jury understands the latter instruc-
tion to call only for a serial testing of elements by the more likely 
than not standard, and if the jury follows this instruction, then they 
might give verdict for the plaintiff in cases for which, under Crite-
rion 1, they should noes It is difficult, however, to find jury 
instructions that are clearly of this type.76 Moreover, even if juries 
were given such an instruction, it is entirely possible that they 
74 Consider, for example, the following instruction: 
For the plaintiff to recover from the defendant on his claim of negligence, you 
must find that all of the following have been proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence: 1. The plaintiff had injuries; 2. The defendant was negligent; and 3. 
The defendant's negligence was a cause of the plaintiff's injuries. If you find 
that any one or more of these statements has not been proved, then your 
verdict must be for the defendant. On the other hand, if you find that all of 
these three statements have been proved, then your verdict must be for the 
plaintiff. 
Colo. Supreme Ct. Comm'n on Civil Jury Instructiol)s, Colorado Jury Instructions 
§ 9.1 (4th ed.1999). 
75 For an illustration, see supra note 56. 
76 Judgments entered pursuant to special verdict forms that require the jury to 
answer only questions about the proof of individual elements may produce such 
results. To be sure, that would not necessarily mean that the difference between 
Crit~rion 1 and Criterion 3 is appreciated when such judgments are entered. See 
Davi_d A. Lombardero, Do Special Verdicts Improve the Structure of Jury Decision-
Makmg?, 36 Jurimetrics J. 275 (1996) (examining the conjunction problems created 
by special verdicts). 
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would understand it as consistent with Criterion 1 in any case 
where the difference between Criterion 3 and Criterion 1 would in 
fact matter. For example, if "preponderance of the evidence" is not 
construed as measured by an invariant specific probability, the jury 
might implicitly construe that standard as applied to a specific ele-
ment in such a way as to assure that the verdict will be for plaintiff 
only if P(A and B) > 0.5. In other words, "preponderance of the 
evidence" might be taken to mean one thing as applied to a single 
element and another as applied to the conjunction of all elements.77 
In the final analysis, what little difference there may be between 
these prescriptions of expected utility theory and extant judicial ut-
terances about the burden of persuasion may be largely or wholly 
unintended, as well as ineffectual, in terms of regulating the con-
duct of jurors. Beyond that, one need not rest entirely on the 
examination of jury instructions and other products of judicial rea-
soning for the conclusion that expected utility theory is closely 
related to doctrine and practice. Powerful evidence exists in consti-
tutional due process jurisprudence. Numerous decisions by the 
United States Supreme Court have employed expected utility the-
ory, more or less explicitly, to analyze arguments that a given 
burden of persuasion, specified by statute or common law, violates 
the constitutional guaranty. Conspicuous in the opinions in such 
cases, whether majorities or dissents, is the common-sense assess-
ment of the relative costs of false positives and false negatives, just 
as expected utility theory suggests. 78 Of course, this jurisprudence 
can be criticized,79 but that does not change the fact that the courts 
77 Following a suggestion by Professor John Kaplan, I have previously argued that 
the very imprecision of the verbal formulae in which burdens of persuasion are stated 
have the virtue of allowing the jury to participate at the margins in setting the level of 
the burden by their interpretation of the standards. See Nance, supra note 46, at 624. 
Here, it is suggested that the jury might use this flexibility to avoid probabilistically 
incoherent results. 
78 See, e.g., Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574, 579-81 (1987); id. at 583-85 (Brennan, 
J., dissenting); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758 (1982); id. at 186-89 (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-27 (1979). 
79 See, e.g., Michael L. DeKay, The Difference Between Blackstone-Like Error 
Ratios and Probabilistic Standards of Proof, 21 Law & Soc. Inquiry 95 (1996) (arguing 
that minimization of expected error costs using an appropriate relative weighting of 
errors, though the better policy, should not be confused, as it sometimes is, with 
minimization of actual error costs using the same weighting). 
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have instantiated expected utility theory in reasoning about the 
burden of persuasion. 5° 
It is therefore quite astonishing that Allen and Leiter assert that 
there is "virtually no ... evidence" for the expected utility theory 
in the case law.81 This is not to say that extant doctrine never di-
verges from the prescriptions that expected utility theorists have 
generated. In particular, the law relating to cases with multiple de-
fendants or multiple plaintiffs is complex and may not correspond 
in all contexts with such theoretical prescriptions.82 Much of this 
theory and law is also relatively new and evolving, however, and it 
is hard to know how much they will diverge from one another once 
they mature and settle into some quasi-stable equilibrium. In any 
event, it is very difficult to deny the usefulness of expected utility 
theory in thinking about proof burdens. 
C. A Close Look at the Relative Plausibility Theory 
There is no plausible interpretation or reconstruction of the usual 
jury instructions regarding burdens of proof that can cause a conver-
gence of doctrine with the relative plausibility theory,83 and this 
remains true if that doctrine is closer to Criterion 1 than to Crite-
rion 3. The main reason is that the relative plausibility theory is 
stated in terms of stories advanced by the parties; indeed, this is the 
source of its claimed advantages. Yet it also entails the possibility 
of a story that would explain the evidence presented but that is not 
offered by either party, which in turn presents the potential for se-
rious divergence between Criterion 2 and each of the other criteria. 
In my view, this "third story" possibility is the most serious prob-
lem for the relative plausibility theory, one that needs to be 
80 The seminal opinion is that of Justice John Marshall Harlan, who explicitly cites 
an important early article using expected utility theory. In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 
370 n.2 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring) (citing Kaplan, supra note 46). 
81 Allen & Leiter, supra note 1, at 1537. 
82 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 Minn. L. Rev. 1219, 1238-57 
{1987) (analyzing the multiple plaintiff problem); David Kaye, The Limits of the 
Preponderance of the Evidence Standard: Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence and 
Multiple Causation, 1982 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 487, 503-08 (analyzing the multiple 
defendant problem). 
83 See Allen & Leiter, supra note 1, at 1537. 
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addressed adequately before it is embraced.84 The crucial question 
is this: Have Allen and Leiter advanced the discussion of this prob,.. 
lem in their present paper? 
In an interesting and revealing passage, they reply as follows to 
an analysis by Posner concerning this issue: 
[Posner] asserts that if 
the plaintiff's story had a probability of .42 of being 
true, the defendant's story a probability of .30 of 
being true, and the probability that another story 
or stories is true was .28, then the plaintiff should 
lose because he has failed to prove that his story is 
more likely than not true. 
[Allen and Leiter reply:] One either knows or does not know 
the implications of the story or set of stories comprising the 
missing 0.28 probability. If these implications are known, each 
party should get the benefit of the probability associated with 
the story or stories that favor them. If the implications are not 
84 The problem was identified in commentaries on Allen's earlier articles. See 
Richard Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing the Process of Proof, 66 
B.U. L. Rev. 439, 471-77 (1986); John Leubsdorf, Stories and Numbers, 13 Cardozo 
L. Rev. 455, 458-59 (1991). To be sure, there are other problems with the relative 
plausibility theory, some of which are addressed in the above-cited articles. One 
difficulty that these articles do not address is the fact that the relative plausibility 
theory, at least as so far presented, aggravates a problem that already afflicts the usual 
account of the conventional proof rules, whether those rules are understood (in the 
civil context) as Criterion 1 or as Criterion 3. That is the problem of missing evidence, 
or as I have called it, "evidential incompleteness." See Nance, supra note 46, at 626-
32. Without further constraints, either Criterion 1 or Criterion 2 might be satisfied in 
cases where reasonably available evidence is not presented in court. This possibility 
becomes more pressing when verdicts for one side are allowed even though the 
probability of that party's story being true is less than 0.5, because one response of 
jurors to the absence of such evidence might well be to discount the probability of 
either or both of the parties stories. For example, faced with very little of the available 
evidence relevant to a case, the jury might assess P(plaintiffs story) = 0.2 and 
P(defendant's story) = 0.1, and under Criterion 2, plaintiff should prevail. This is 
problematic because the law's coercive mechanisms should not be made available to 
private parties under such a paucity of evidence. The solution, under either theory, is 
to incorporate a further constraint under the rubric of the burden of production. See 
id. at 625-26. 
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known, there is no good reason to systematically disfavor plain-
tiffs by attributing all the ambiguity to them.85 
Posner is wrong, to be sure, and for essentially the reasons stated 
by Allen and Leiter. But the relative plausibility theory does not 
prescribe the result that Allen and Leiter endorse for this situation. 
Criterion 2 clearly provides that plaintiff wins even if the third 
story, garnering the 0.28 probability, favors defendant, because by 
hypothesis that story is not the story that defendant presents. 
Allen and Leiter have an answer of sorts to this problem. They 
continue their response to Posner by arguing, "[i]n civil cases, 
given mutual discovery, the parties can be expected to search for 
and produce evidence of whatever stories they think can plausibly 
support their legal claims. "86 This, of course, changes the hypotheti-
cal by assuming that if the third story favors the defendant, the 
defendant will have advanced that story as an alternative theory of 
the case.87 Allen and Leiter's response must be construed as an as-
sertion that hypotheticals like the one posited by Posner will not 
occur so long as at least one side of the dispute can discern that the 
third story would be favorable to that side under the substantive 
law.88 But is this true? 
85 Allen & Leiter, supra note 1, at 1530-31 (quoting Posner, supra note 12, at 1513) 
(footnote omitted). 
86 Allen & Leiter, supra note 1, at 1531. 
87 One might object that the whole point of the relative plausibility theory is 
undermined by allowing alternative stories, a step that begins to move the whole 
scheme in the direction of its rival. If the primary virtue of the theory, however, is 
sufficient simplicity to permit juries to adhere to its prescriptions, then it is not fatally 
flawed by permitting a limited number of alternative stories to be advanced by a 
party. 
"Ironically, a similar proposition was advanced by Professor Richard Lempert in 
criticizing the relative plausibility theory. His argument was that there will be few 
situations in which the relative plausibility criterion of decision will in fact diverge 
from the "more likely than not" criterion. See Lempert, supra note 84, at 473-74 
(arguing that in nearly all cases a "spoliation inference" will cause the jury to 
reevaluate the probabilities so as to rule out the third story, reasoning that if there 
were evidence supporting the third story, the party favored by it would have offered 
that evidence). For reasons explained below, I think Lempert is wrong on this point; 
there are often cases in which no such spoliation inference should or will occur. In any 
event, Lempert does acknowledge at least the possibility that cases will arise with 
significant probabilities assigned by the jury to stories not advanced by either party, 
and in that eventuality Lempert favors the solution prescribed by Criterion 1. Id. at 
474-75. 
1578 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 87:1551 
Consider what I will call "the traffic signal problem." Plaintiff al-
leges that defendant ran a red light, causing an accident. Defendant 
alleges that his light was green. At trial, the parties tell their stories 
as alleged. There is only one element, negligence that the parties 
dispute, and the color of the light is the only material fact deter-
mining negligence. The jury assesses the probabilities as follows: 
P(defendant entered on red light)= 0.42 
P(defendant entered on green light)= 0.30 
P( defendant entered on yellow light) = 0.28 
Notice that, regardless of which party the law favors if the light 
was yellow, each litigant has successfully settled on the theory of 
the case that the jury finds most plausible among those that favor 
that litigant. Criterion 2 prescribes that plaintiff should win be-
cause 0.42 > 0.30, and this is so even if the rule of law is that 
entering on a yellow light is not negligent. 89 According to Allen and 
Leiter, however, in that event the 0.28 probability should inure to 
the benefit of defendant, and plaintiff should lose because 0.42 < 
0.30 + 0.28. Note that this is the result under Criterion 1, the rule 
prescribed by the expected utility theory. Presumably, Allen and 
Leiter would try to escape this dilemma by arguing, as they do in 
response to Posner, that the hypothetical is wrong and that in real-
ity such a defendant would plead and testify in the alternative, 
telling the story that the light was either green or yellow. This 
would generate the same defense verdict, but without having to 
rely on Criterion 1 since Criterion 2 gives the same result. 
Does this strategy work? For theorists concerned with realistic 
behavioral assessments, it is striking that Allen and Leiter would 
reject out of hand the possibility that the defendant, wanting to tell 
a single coherent story, will tell only the story that his light was 
green. For example, he may believe that by telling a story in the al-
ternative he will present himself to the jury as someone who is 
unsure of his recollections, thus quite possibly reducing the jury's 
89 I am assuming-at this point-that the color of the light unequivocally determines 
whether or not defendant was negligent. Reality is more complicated than that, 
especially in regard to a yellow light, but the assumption makes it easier to illustrate 
the point of the hypothetical. The assumption is relaxed in the discussion infra, at 
notes 95-105 and accompanying text. 
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assessment of the probabilities of both his stories and raising the 
jury's assessment of the plaintiff's story, which of course may be 
told with absolute confidence.90 This behavioral assumption strikes 
me as reflecting exactly the kind of strategy that clients will be in-
clined to follow and that advocates will be inclined to encourage in 
such a case.91 Beyond that, procedural rules might actually preclude 
the use of alternative stories in particular cases.92 
The disincentive to tell the yellow light story can be even more 
pronounced if we change the hypothetical by assuming, more real-
istically, that the rule of law is that entry on a yellow light may or 
may not be negligent depending on how the circumstances are 
evaluated under a general "reasonableness" standard. In such a 
case, it is quite possible that neither party will want to tell the story 
that the light was yellow, each one fearing that such a claim would 
be taken as a concession of doubt and also worrying that the jury 
might resolve the judgmental issue for a yellow light in favor of the 
opposing party. For risk-averse litigants, and those who just miscal-
culate, the polarizing tendency in such a context can be powerful 
indeed.93 
""Cf. Leubsdorf, supra note 84, at 459 ("Strategic reasoning might ... lead a party to 
avoid a more plausible but more moderate story for fear that the jury will interpret 
any concession as evidence that there must be a lot more to concede."). 
'
1 After discovery is completed, clients are often advised that they must eliminate 
alternative inconsistent pleadings by the time they get to trial so that they can go 
before the jury with a single unambiguous story. See, e.g., Robert H. Klonoff & Paul 
L. Colby, Sponsorship Strategy: Evidentiary Tactics for Winning Jury Trials 50 (1990) 
(advising against going to trial with multiple inconsistent theories of a case). 
"Allen and Leiter themselves rely on the case of McCormick v. Kopmann, 161 
N.E.2d 720 (III. App. 1959), which concerns the use of alternative pleading and stories 
at trial. Allen & Leiter, supra note 1, at 1530. The opinion in that case warns that 
~hen the pleading party has personal knowledge of which of two incompatible stories 
Is correct, telling both in the alternative is not permitted. McCormick, 161 N.E.2d at 
727-28. Of course, Allen and Leiter might want to change this procedural rule, but 
that would still leave the other problems discussed in the text. 
".In the quoted reply to Posner, Allen and Leiter suggest that cases might arise in 
which "[o]ne ... does not know the implications of the story or set of stories 
comprising the missing 0.28 probability," and argue that in such a case "there is.no 
good reason to systematically disfavor plaintiffs by attributing all the ambiguity to 
them," as is required by Criterion 1. Allen & Leiter, supra note 1, at 1530-31. 
Presumably, this refers not to a case like that presented in the text, in which the jurors 
are able to determine the legal implication of the third story even though the parties 
cannot predict what the jury will do, but rather to a case in which the jury cannot 
make the legal determination for such a story. In other words, the jury in such a case 
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This fact is not lost on juries. Juries, I suspect, commonly believe 
that neither story told by the parties is very likely to be completely 
true, that more likely there is some third story that neither party 
tells exactly-often a compromise taken in part from the plaintiff's 
story and in part from the defendant's. 94 Indeed, the social science 
upon which Allen and Leiter rely describes jurors as constructing a 
story from the evidence presented, not passively accepting or re-
jecting the stories told by the parties,95 and there is no reason at all 
to believe that such a constructed story will necessarily or even 
likely match one of the stories told by the parties, certainly not in 
every particular. Under the expected utility theory and the inter-
pretation of prevailing doctrine that is compatible with it, the jury 
must consider which side is favored legally by that compromise 
story and attribute its assessed probability accordingly.96 This will 
not happen under the relative plausibility model, though, unless ju-
cannot say whether the story to which they attribute a 0.28 probability is one that, if 
true, favors the plaintiff. This appears to be simply a defect in the instructions given 
on the substantive law and would call for clarification. Absent such clarification, in a 
case for which the missing 0.28 probability would make the difference between a 
verdict for the plaintiff and a verdict for the defense, I can see no reason not to treat 
the case the same as one would treat those unusual cases in which, on purely factual 
grounds, the jury has no confidence that the decision criterion has been met-the 
"equipoise" cases for which the law assigns the verdict to the defendant by default. 
The "good reasons" to do so are the same: institutional inertia to avoid enforcement 
costs and (when applicable) to avoid the stigma of fault attributions about which the 
system does not have confidence. 
94 Cf. Klonoff & Colby, supra note 91 (developing at book length the implications of 
the proposition that juries assume the truth can be no more favorable to a party than 
the party's assertions). 
95 See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision 
Making: The Story Model, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 519 (1991), cited in Allen & Leiter, 
supra note 1, at 1528 n.llO. 
96 Professor David Kaye illustrates this in his effort to formalize the use of "stories" 
in expected utility theory terms. He expresses the probability of interest as "Pr(SriE)," 
meaning the probability that plaintiff's story is true given the evidence in the case, 
David H. Kaye, Comment, Do We Need a Calculus of Weight to Understand Proof 
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?, 66 B.U. L. Rev. 657, 661 (1986), and argues, in the 
context of criminal cases: 
Some factual contentions in sr may not be essential to satisfying the elements of 
the offense. For instance, the prosecution may argue that the defendant acted 
with a particular motive, but the jury may convict even though it concludes that 
the defendant acted for a different reason. Perhaps sr should be thought of as 
the minimal body of contentions along the lines suggested by the prosecution 
that, if believed, would warrant a verdict of guilty. 
Id. at 661 n.lO. 
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rors ignore the instructions that would have to be given pursuant to 
it. 
For example, as a modification of the traffic signal problem, 
suppose the rule is that entry on a yellow light must be evaluated 
under a general reasonableness standard, while entry on red or 
green is still governed by a per se rule. Once again, the plaintiff tes-
tifies that defendant's light was red, but now the defendant testifies 
that his light was either green or yellow and that-in order to ad-
dress the reasonableness standard-defendant could not see the 
plaintiff's car enter the intersection to make a turn after a stop on a 
red light. Suppose further that the jury considers the "I couldn't 
see him" claim as likely to be true as its negation, resulting in the 
following attributions of probability:97 
Color of 
defendant's 
Defendant 
could NOT 
Defendant Total 
probability 
Shading indicates those three of the six basic stories that, if known 
to be true, would require a verdict for the plaintiff under the as-
sumed substantive law; the stories for the three unshaded cells 
favor the defendant. In such a case, should the jury give defendant 
the benefit of the 0.30 + 0.14 = 0.44 probability that the light was 
either green (no negligence) or yellow-without-seeing-plaintiff (no 
negligence in this context), or should it only credit defendant with 
the 0.15 + 0.14 = 0.29 probability that the light was either green-
without-seeing-plaintiff or yellow-without-seeing-plaintiff? If the 
former, defendant wins, because 0.42 is less than 0.44. If the latter, 
plaintiff wins, because 0.42 is greater than 0.29. To be faithful to 
the premises of the relative plausibility theory, the answer would 
have to be the latter, even though the "I couldn't see him" claim is 
97 The table assumes for simplicity that the probability that the defendant could see 
the plaintiff is independent of the light color and that the choice of story that 
defendant tells has not affected the total probabilities associated with each light color 
when compared to the problem as originally presented. 
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immaterial under the hypothesis of a green light. The jury has no 
flexibility to attribute to the defendant the "compromise" story 
that the light was green but the defendant could see the plaintiff's 
car because that is not a story the defendant presented.98 
Once again, parties might try to avoid this kind of problem by 
telling alternative stories. For example, the defendant in this ex-
ample might advance the following claims: (a) his light was green 
and he could not see the plaintiff's car; (b) his light was green even 
though he could see the plaintiff's car; or (c) his light was yellow 
and he could not see the plaintiff's car. Just to articulate this possi-
bility reaffirms the point made above, that parties may be unwilling 
(or not permitted) to make such allegations expressly or to ad-
vance such explanations in the evidence presented. The problem 
only becomes worse as additional pieces of the parties' stories are 
rejected by the jury or even just considered less than certainly 
true. 99 
In the end, the relative plausibility theory will acceptably handle 
the problem of the third story only under the remarkably fortui-
tous condition that the attribution to the parties of probabilities 
associated with third stories would not affect, in any significant 
number of cases, the results of the probabilistic comparison of the 
stories that are advanced by the parties.100 Maybe this condition 
holds, but there is no empirical evidence that it does. A priori con-
siderations do not lead to any obvious conclusion on the matter 
except that it is very problematic. Most importantly, the polarizing 
effect described above may well create situations in which the most 
plausible story is not told by either party, and the effect of attributing 
the most plausible story could well swamp the direct plausibility com-
parison of the stories that are told.101 There are also more subtle 
98 The particular example presented takes advantage of the applicability of both a 
per se negligence rule and a general reasonableness standard in the context of the 
same case, but other examples can easily be constructed that do not have this feature. 
99 Obviously, one might stipulate that the jury is free to "modify" the parties' stories 
as it believes the evidence warrants and then to compare the stories as modified. But 
this is simply to begin the process of moving from Criterion 2 to Criterion 1, and it is 
very hard to see any coherent stopping point on that progression. 
100 At one point, Allen appeared to believe that this would be the case, though he 
gave no reason to support that belief. See Allen, supra note 61, at 410 n.118. 
101 It is reported that the physicist E.T. Jaynes has shown that "a good approximation of 
the probability of an hypothesis can usually be attained by comparing it with the next most 
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effects that make satisfaction of the indicated condition problem-
atic. 
For example, in the original traffic signal problem, for which a 
yellow light unequivocally favors defendant but neither party tells 
the story that it was yellow, attribution of the probability assigned 
to the yellow light story-though not the most plausible of the 
three-still changes the result that the relative plausibility theory 
produces. Indeed, that was the whole point of the example. In the 
perhaps more realistic modification of that hypothetical, where a 
yellow light throws things into a judgmental "reasonableness" 
standard and the issue arises whether defendant could see the 
plaintiff's car, the question whether such attribution affects the re-
sult under the relative plausibility theory depends fortuitously on 
exactly which stories are advanced by the parties. If, on the one 
hand, the plaintiff asserts that the defendant's light was red and the 
defendant could see his car (probability of 0.21 ), and the defendant 
asserts that the light was green and he could not see the plaintiff's 
car (probability of 0.15), then attribution of the probabilities asso-
ciated with other possibilities does not affect the result. On the 
other hand, if the plaintiff tells the story that the light was red and 
the defendant could see him (probability of 0.21 ), while the defen-
dant asserts that the light was either green or yellow and he could 
not see the plaintiff (probability of 0.29), then attribution of the 
other probabilities does affect the result. A number of other com-
binations can be imagined. In other words, a great deal-too 
much-turns on the strategic decisions of the parties about which 
stories to endorse in their pleadings and testimony. 
One further, but related, set of problems should be noted. In 
previous papers, Allen has argued that the jury need not be in-
structed on the elements of the substantive law at all since the 
judge will have performed the check to see if the stories advanced 
satisfy the substantive law requirements applicable to each side.102 
likely hypothesis." Bernard Robertson & G.A. Vignaux, Probability-The Logic of the 
Law, 13 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 457, 471-72 (1993). Putting aside the question of how 
good of an approximation is good enough, such a result obviously will not help the 
relative plausibility theory if the parties do not tell the two most likely stories. Id. at 
472. 
102 See Allen, supra note 61, at 410 n.l18. In the same passage, Allen allowed for the 
possibility that jurors might be instructed in the elements of a cause of action and then 
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This would appear to be a significant advantage, eliminating what 
many consider to be cumbersome and poorly understood jury in-
structions on the substantive law. There is a significant price to be 
paid for this advantage, however. First, putting aside problems of 
judgmental standards that the jury is supposed to apply but about 
which they will be unaware absent instruction, and assuming once 
again that there is a determinate legal rule for entry on a yellow 
light, a lack of substantive instruction would complicate the jury's 
task considerably. For example, the jury would not have the bene-
fit of an instruction on the significance of a yellow light under the 
substantive law, and so could not attribute the probability associ-
ated with the yellow light story to either party except by legislating 
for such cases. It may not be bad, all things considered, for juries to 
make their own law in some cases, and the use of judgmental stan-
dards like "reasonableness" often has this effect, but why should 
the jury's authority to do so depend on the fortuity of whether or 
not the parties have advanced the story to which some law must be 
applied? 103 
Second, without instructions on the substantive law, the jury 
cannot know which facts the law regards as material. Conse-
quently, it cannot distinguish those parts of a party's story that can 
be disregarded in assessing relative plausibility. For example, if 
plaintiff's story in the traffic signal problem included a reference to 
some immaterial fact, such as the color of the hat he was wearing 
that day, that the jury comes to believe is completely implausible, 
may it disregard that factual assertion in assessing the plausibility 
of the plaintiff's story as a whole?104 Again, the jury could be left to 
its own devices in deciding whether to disregard that matter, and 
the jury's common-sense judgment would undoubtedly be consis-
tent with the law's judgment in some cases but not in others. Even 
in those cases in which it is consistent, that degree of happy fortuity 
permitted to apply them to third stories. ld. In that case, however, his relative 
plausibility theory unravels as a decision criterion. See infra Section II.D. 
103 With regard to the situation in which the jury would believe, rightly or wrongly, 
that they have no authority to make up the law when none is given to them, see supra 
note 93. 
104 Of course, the inaccuracy of the plaintiff's story in regard to the color of the hat 
might have indirect effects on the material facts by influencing plaintiff's credibility. 
But even if the plaintiff loses credibility, the probability of the material portions of the 
plaintiff's story being true might still be much higher than the probability that 
plaintiff's entire story is true. 
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depends on the jury's being aware that it has the authority to make 
such judgments at all; jurors might well believe that they must ac-
cept either the plaintiff's story as is or the defendant's story as is. 
Indeed, this might be true even if the jury is instructed on the sub-
stantive law if it is also instructed in accord with the relative 
plausibility theory. In order to avoid such a result, any instruction 
based on Criterion 2 would need to be combined with instructions 
on the substantive law and an instruction that the jury may disre-
gard immaterial portions of the stories told, except insofar as they 
relate to credibility. Like other changes that would be needed to 
make the relative plausibility theory work acceptably, this would 
cause that theory to converge toward the theory it was designed to 
displace. 
D. The Most Plausible Story Theory 
As already observed, the empirical literature has emphasized the 
jury's role in reconstructing what happened out of the evidence 
that the parties present. This suggests a rather different theory that 
sometimes appears in the arguments. Recall Allen and Leiter's 
summary regarding civil cases: 
The critical insight of the relative plausibility theory is that legal 
factfinding involves a determination of the comparative 
plausibility of the parties' explanations offered at trial rather 
than a determination of whether discrete elements are found to 
a specific probability. In civil cases the factfinder is to identify 
the most plausible account of the relevant events .... 105 
If one reads the second sentence as unmodified by the first, then 
the use of the superlative term "most" in the second sentence, 
rather than the comparative "more," suggests that the jury's task 
would be to identify the single most plausible story, whether or not 
advanced by a party, presumably then applying the substantive 
law-about which it would have to be instructed-to that most 
plausible (probable) story by determining whether or not it satis-
fies all the elements of the cause of acticin.106 This theory invites us 
105 Allen & Leiter, supra note 1, at 1527-28 (emphasis added). 
106 The alternative to instructing the jury on the elements of the substantive law 
would be to require the jury to report the most plausible story in detail to the judge, 
who would then apply the substantive law. This would be a form of a special verdict. 
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to conceptualize the reconstruction in terms of the jury generating 
a set of mutually incompatible, plausible accounts that are, or at 
least could be, rank ordered from most plausible to least plausible. 
The jury then selects the one at the top of the list: the most plausi-
ble account.107 
This "pick the most plausible story (whether advanced by a 
party or not)" theory is an interesting one in itself. In some ways, it 
seems analogous to the "pick the best heuristic" approach to deci-
sionmaking, which in various contexts has been shown to produce 
surprisingly accurate decisions. 108 According to the latter theory, a 
decisionmaker focuses on just one important factor in making a 
decision, ignoring all others. That theory, however, is Considerably 
different from the most plausible story theory, which does not iso-
late a specific evidential factor in a case (such as the credibility of 
the sole witness to an event) but rather isolates the single most 
plausible story that would explain the evidence. Whether that ap-
proach, applied across the long run of trials, would enjoy accuracy 
and economy of cognitive resources at levels that would be accept-
able in the legal context is, once again, an open and largely 
empirical question. There is reason, however, to be skeptical. In 
particular, the most plausible story approach suffers from problems 
similar to those besetting the relative plausibility theory. 
Applied, for example, to the traffic signal problem, the "most 
plausible story" approach would require a verdict for the plaintiff 
even if the jury believes that it is more likely than not that the light 
was either yellow or green and thus that defendant was not negli-
gent.109 By definition, under this theory, there could be no aggregation 
of probabilities associated with distinct and incompatible stories. 
Such an awkward procedure would strongly encourage challenges to the jury's verdict 
based on insignificant details or infelicities of expression in the jury's report. 
107 Those accounts not at the top of the list might not need to be fully worked out so 
long as the jury has confidence that none can be worked out in such a fashion as to 
move into first place. The possibility that no single story is most plausible could be 
handled easily enough, at least in the most probable context of such an unlikely event, 
a two-way tie for the most plausible. Either both stories favor the same party and the 
decision is easy or they split between favoring the plaintiff and favoring the 
defendant, in which case the familiar default rule in favor of the defendant would 
presumably apply. 
108 See Gigerenzer eta!., supra note 57, at 73-188. 
109 In terms of the previous discussion, this assumes either that the law attributes 
non-negligence to an entry on yellow or that the jury determines such an entry to be 
non-negligent under the particular circumstances. 
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Even if the defendant presented the case in the alternative, arguing 
that the light was either green or yellow, the jury would be re-
quired to accept the si~gle most plausi~le story-th~t the light was 
red. If disjunctive stones could be considered as a smgle story, the 
whole idea collapses. Specifically, if any mutually incompatible sto-
ries could be combined to form a "single" disjunctive or alternative 
story, then the single most plausi.ble story w~~ld always be the dis-
junction of all possi.ble ston~s, with ayrobabihty of 1. If only those 
mutually incompatible stones favonng the same party could be 
combined into a disjunctive story, then the theory collapses into 
Criterion 1. I suspect that the latter is what Allen and Leiter had in 
mind, and their reply to Posner's three story hypothetical tends to 
confirm this, for they do not argue that the plaintiff in Posner's hy-
pothetical should win just because his explanation is the most 
plausible of the three.110 
The most plausible story approach can safely ignore aggregation 
problems only on the condition that the attribution of probabilities 
associated with all stories that are not the most plausible would not 
affect the verdict dictated by the most plausible story in any signifi-
cant number of cases. That means downplaying the traffic signal 
problem (in various permutations) as atypical, not on the ground 
that one of the parties will always tell the yellow light story as an 
alternative, but on the distinct ground that only in a small percent-
age of cases, small enough to ignore for practical purposes, will the 
""See supra text accompanying note 85. Allen and Leiter's occasional use of 
language suggesting a most plausible story theory may be motivated by a desire to 
account for the rules that arguably should apply in some, but not all, cases with more 
than two parties, rather than two party cases with more than two stories. See supra 
note 82 and accompanying text. At one point, Allen and Leiter discuss the three party 
case of McCormick v. Kopmann, 161 N.E.2d 720 (Ill. App. 1959), and make the 
following assertion: "The jury was essentially instructed to return a verdict against the 
part~-plaintiff or either defendant-most likely liable for the event, just as the 
relative plausibility theory would predict." Allen & Leiter, supra note 1, at 1530 
(footnote omitted). I have read the opinion carefully and can find nothing supporting 
such . a proposition; the only quoted jury instruction concerning the issue of 
contnbutor:y negligence as a defense to the plaintiff's claim against one of the 
defendants Is not written in such comparative terms at all: 
[I]f you find from all of the evidence in the case that [plaintiff] (McConnick) 
was operating his automobile while intoxicated and that such intoxication, if 
any, contributed proximately to cause the collision in question, then in that case 
**.*you should find the defendant, Lorence Kopmann, not guilty. 
McCornuck, 161 N.E.2d at 725. That reads pretty squarely as Criterion 1. 
1588 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 87:1551 
most probable story be outweighed by less probable stories that 
cumulate on balance to favor the other side. That condition is per-
haps intuitively more plausible than the analogous condition that 
must be satisfied by the relative plausibility theory, if only because 
in many cases the most likely story may not be the one told by either 
party.m Nevertheless, the satisfaction of the indicated condition for 
the most plausible story heuristic also remains both undemon-
strated and highly conjectural. As with the relative plausibility 
theory, it would be unwise to adopt the most plausible story theory 
as a decision criterion until these issues are adequately addressed. 
E. A Synthesis: Distinguishing Decision Rules 
from Inferential Methods 
Despite what I have argued, I think there is considerable merit 
in the relative plausibility and most plausible story theories, and I 
want to state clearly in what respect that is so. To see their real 
value, one must distinguish between decision rules and inferential 
methods. In terms of decision rules, the problem of third stories 
convinces me, for the time being, that Criterion 1 is superior to 
both Criterion 2 and its "most likely story" variation, at least for 
the two party, binary choice case. Nevertheless, most theorists now 
understand (if ever they did not) that litigants try to tell a coherent 
story, and-as an inferential rule of thumb-the jury ordinarily 
should and probably does start by comparing the relative plausibili-
ties of the stories told by the parties.112 That, it seems to me, is the 
core of good sense in the relative plausibility idea as well as the 
import of the various anecdotal statements in case law that Allen 
and Leiter amass in support of it. 113 If no combination of third sto-
ries, whether wholly distinct from those of the parties or in 
compromise of them, is plausible enough to make a difference in 
111 See supra note 100 and accompanying text. As we have seen, the relative 
plausibility theory severely constrains the jury's freedom to use its epistemic resources 
in what the jury considers the most effective way by ruling out of bounds all third 
stories that the parties have not advanced and, implicitly, the heuristic strategies or 
other considerations that might lead the jury to such stories. The most plausible story 
theory at least preserves the jury's epistemic freedom to construct a story not told by 
the parties and so is much less affected by the strategic choices of the parties. 
112 Others have made similar suggestions. E.g., Lempert, supra note 84, at 473; 
Posner, supra note 12, at 1513; Robertson & Vignaux, supra note 101, at 470-73. 
113 See Allen & Leiter, supra note 1, at 1528-34. 
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the case, then the jury is done; it need only check the one party's 
more plausible story ~gain_st the. elements of the s~bstantive law. 
But if such third stones-mcludmg any most plausible story that 
the jury can construct-make a difference in the result, then the 
jury must take them into accou~t as well. Thus,_ aspects of the rela-
tive plausibility and most plausible story theones can complement 
rather than contradict expected utility theory, giving coherence to 
the former and descriptive depth to the latter.114 
An obvious advantage of such an accommodation is that it 
would help to defuse certain puzzling features of the focus on ele-
ments of a cause of action. Elsewhere, for example, Allen has 
argued that such a focus "conflates formal elements and facts": 
Having found the facts, the law is applied deductively for the 
most part. Thus, the question is not: 'Has each of the elements 
been proven by a preponderance of the evidence?' The ques-
tion is instead: 'Given the facts as we have found them, do they 
entail each of the elements?'115 
Expected utility theorists understand well that the expression "the 
probability of negligence" is a shorthand way of saying, "the prob-
ability that the events that occurred instantiate the elements of 
negligence." And judges and jurors surely would see no difference 
between an instruction that said, "Plaintiff must prove negligence 
by a preponderance of the evidence," and one that said, "Plaintiff 
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence events that consti-
tute negligence." Nonetheless, explicit attention to the underlying 
stories or explanations makes clear that we are thinking about 
events rather than elements as such, even though our assessment of 
those events should not be artificially constrained to the accounts 
advanced by the parties. 
Understanding that point, at least implicitly, expected utility 
theorists tend not to take seriously supposed claims about paradox 
that are thought to attend Criterion 1 when coupled with the 
multiplicative property that might be used (but certainly need not 
H'It should go without saying that in a particular case the jury might be right not to 
consider this inferential method to be the one best suited to the task, and I can see no 
reason to require them to use it. Any attempt to formalize the relative plausibility 
theory, for example by way of jury instructions, would have to be quite clear that the 
comparison of plausibilities is merely a sometimes useful starting point. 
Hs Allen, supra note 58, at 272. 
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be used) to relate the conjunctive probability to the probability of 
individual elements. For example, for a two element claim, the 
multiplicative property states: 
P(A and B)= P(A) x P(BIA), 
while for a three element claim, 
P(X and Yand Z) = P(X) x P(YIX) x P(ZIX andY). 
Using such properties, Allen and Leiter reiterate the claim that 
Criterion 1, together with its corresponding extension to more than 
two elements, produces arbitrary results based on the fortuity of 
the number of elements into which the cause of action is broken 
down: 
Take the example of theft and murder. Theft has considerably 
more elements than murder. Thus to convict for theft requires 
on average that intent to steal [for example, element X above] 
be established to a higher probability than intent to kill [for ex-
ample, element A above] for a murder conviction.116 
However, Professor Richard D. Friedman's earlier reply to the 
same argument demonstrates that the apparent paradox is a mirage 
if one keeps in view the substance of the claim rather than the ele-
ments by reference to which its legal sufficiency is assessed: 
[A]ssuming a claim is not altered substantively, dividing the 
claim into more elements will in fact raise the average probabil-
ity that a fact-finder would assign to each element. Because the 
redivision of the claim has not altered its substance, the fact-
finder's assessment of the probability of the truth of the entire 
claim cannot have changed; it follows that the average of the 
probabilities that the fact-finder assigns to each element must 
rise. Looked at another way, a corollary of the division of a 
claim into more elements without altering the substance of the 
claim is that there is less content in each of the elements. The 
average probability of the elements would therefore be ex-
116 Allen & Leiter, supra note 1, at 1504--05. 
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pected to rise, especially given that the elements are not inde-
pendent.117 
To revert to Allen and Leiter's example, even if it is true that in-
tent to steal must be shown to a higher probability than intent to 
kill, that does not mean that the prosecution's overall burden of 
persuasion is higher in a theft case than in a murder case.ns All that 
one can say is that, under an expanded version of augmented Cri-
terion 1, the division of a given cause into a greater number of 
elements means that there will be a larger number of subsidiary 
tests to be satisfied, each of which will be easier to satisfy.n9 
There are further advantages to the proposed synthesis. Distin-
guishing between decision rules and inferential rules of thumb 
allows the relative plausibility theory to accommodate other com-
plications that are embarrassing to the theory as put forth by Allen 
and Leiter. For example, a serious argument can be made that 
"more likely than not" is not the best standard of proof for all civil 
cases, even simple two party cases, and indeed, it is not employed 
in all such cases. As the Supreme Court's due process cases dem-
onstrate, it depends on the costs associated with false positives and 
false negatives.120 Even for garden variety civil cases, the "more 
likely than not" rule is often dubious. While it makes sense in cases 
of strict, no-fault liability, it is not demanding enough for cases in 
which liability entails publicly labeling someone as having 
breached a serious moral obligation, such as those alleging fraud, 
117 Richard D. Friedman, Answering the Bayesioskeptical Challenge, 1 Int'l J. 
Evidence & Proof 276, 283 (1997). Indeed, this illustrates once more why Criterion 1 
is superior to Criterion 3. As Friedman argues, if one uses an element-by-element 
decision criterion like our Criterion 3: "(T]he more elements a claim is divided into, 
the easier it is for the plaintiff to satisfy the burden .... Thus, defining the standard of 
persuasion in terms of individual elements becomes incoherent." ld. at 280. 
118 If anything, one might expect that the jury would apply the same nominal 
"beyond reasonable doubt" standard in such criminal cases by recognizing that what 
might be. reasonable doubt in a murder trial might not be reasonable doubt in a theft 
trial. See supra note 77. 
11
' Due to random variance in the assessment of probability as to each element, the 
sheer multiplicity of tests might offset the increasing average probability for the truth 
of individual elements by presenting a greater chance of getting at least one 
determination on a particular element that is adverse to the party with the burden of 
persuasion. This second order effect does not significantly undermine Friedman's 
basic point. 
120 See sources cited supra note 78. 
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gross negligence, and perhaps even ordinary negligence-and the 
law often reflects this fact. 121 Allen and Leiter have not suggested 
an intelligible way for the relative plausibility theory to handle 
these kinds of adjustments and remain a decision rule. 122 
The expected utility theory can readily incorporate this kind of 
consideration because such cases involve a disutility from a false posi-
tive (for example, an erroneous statement that defendant breached a 
serious duty of care) that exceeds the disutility from a false negative 
(for example, an erroneous statement that an injury was acciden-
tal), producing a critical probability greater than 0.5.123 Further, if 
an elevated standard of proof were viewed as necessary for only 
one of several elements of a cause of action, this situation can also 
be accommodated by employing Criterion 1 augmented by are-
quirement-which could easily be conveyed in a jury instruction-
that the particular element must be established by the higher stan-
dard.124 Once again, the comparative plausibility of the parties' 
stories is a useful place for the jury to begin assessment, but that 
theory cannot do all the necessary work. 
In one respect, however, this synthesis does not appear to ac-
complish the epistemological goals of the relative plausibility 
121 See Dale A. Nance, Civility and the Burden of Proof, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 
647,659-72 {1994). 
122 But see Allen, supra note 61, at 413 (claiming that the relative plausibility theory 
can accommodate the intermediate standard "clear and convincing proof' and 
translating it as "a considerably more persuasive story than its opposition," but not 
explaining how much more is "considerably more" and acknowledging that this is 
"the most troublesome standard of proof for this theory"). 
123 Allen and Leiter might object that once one moves away from the "0.5 rule" one 
cannot make a transformation analogous to that from Criterion 1 to Alternative 
Criterion 1, and thus one must require jurors to calculate an actual number. In most 
cases it is true that jurors do not, and perhaps cannot be expected to, "calculate 
probabilities" in deciding a case, but it is important to remember that the actual 
specification of a number, whether by calculation or intuition, is not a necessary 
feature of these criteria. As Professor Peter Donnelly has observed, all that is 
necessary to the application of such criteria is to decide whether one probability is 
greater than another, even when the "other" probability is quantified: "As in the 
quantitative sciences, the task of establishing that some quantity falls (say) above a 
particular value is easier, often enormously so, than an exact evaluation of the 
quantity." Peter Donnelly, Approximation, Comparison, and Bayesian Reasoning in 
Juridical Proof, 1 lnt'l J. Evidence & Proof 304, 306 {1997). 
124 A common example of this kind of situation is the requirement that malice be 
proved with clear and convincing evidence in order to warrant punitive damages. See, 
e.g., Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1363 (Me. 1985). 
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theory, and for that reason, if no other, it may be unacceptable to 
Allen and Leiter. Recall that a principal virtue claimed for the the-
ory is that it offers a way out of the bleak prospect of the jury being 
required to attend to all possible explanations, including an enor-
mous range of low-probability stories, lest some accumulation of 
such stories affect the decision one way or the other. Insofar as the 
proposed synthesis requires attention to third stories, that prospect 
remains troublesome. The key in Allen and Leiter's discussion ap-
pears to be the suggestion that the jury limit its attention only to a 
much smaller set of "plausible" stories. Nevertheless, Allen and 
Leiter provide us no real help as to how such a restriction of atten-
tion is to be achieved. 
In this regard, remember what Allen and Leiter have to say 
about criminal cases: "[I]n criminal cases the prosecution must 
provide a plausible account of guilt and show that there is no plau-
sible account of innocence. "125 It is difficult to quarrel with this 
statement as a reading of the "beyond reasonable doubt" standard 
of criminal law. But questions quickly emerge. Most obviously, in 
what respect is this an instantiation of a relative plausibility theory? 
How does this rule follow from the idea that "legal factfinding in-
volves a determination of the comparative plausibility of the 
parties' explanations offered at trial"?126 There is simply nothing 
comparative about the test Allen and Leiter state for criminal 
cases, because "plausibility" here is necessarily assessed in the ab-
stract, not as compared to some other story.127 Allen and Leiter 
thus avoid the problem of the third story only at the cost of remov-
ing criminal law from the relative plausibility framework. And 
there is no clue here as to how, even in principle, one can deter-
mine how probable the defendant's story must be in order to be 
plausible or in what other way the jury is to decide whether a story 
is plausible. 
125 Allen & Leiter, supra note 1, at 1527-28. 
126 I d. 
127 Presumably this shift is necessitated, at least in part, by the narrower availability 
of discovery in criminal cases. Recall their argument: "In civil cases, given mutual 
discovery, the parties can be expected to search for and produce evidence of whatever 
stories they think can plausibly support their legal claims." Allen & Leiter, supra note 
1, at 1531. 
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Admittedly, the criminal standard of proof is notoriously diffi-
cult to interpret. Nevertheless, if one construes the "beyond 
reasonable doubt" standard as a common-sense, non-quantitative 
way of expressing the result of a calculation under the expected 
utility theory, something like "greater than 95% probability," then 
at least in principle there is a standard by which to assess whether 
reasonable doubt exists: When combined with third stories that 
neither party tells, defendant's explanation should identify a 5% 
probability of innocence. Once again, in making these assessments, 
whether quantified or not, a comparison of the degree of plausibil-
ity of the prosecution story and the defense story is a very useful 
starting point. The jury is well on its way to a verdict if there is a 
consensus that the prosecution's story is twenty times more likely 
than the defendant's. Nonetheless, the possibility of the third story 
means that, even in such a case, the jury's work is not quite fin-
ished.128 
We shall never have a complete account of factfinding until we 
know much more about the question of what makes a story plausi-
ble, or rather plausible enough to be considered with respect to the 
task at hand, and Allen and Leiter should be praised for insisting 
that we give attention to this issue. At the same time, this missing 
piece in the theory of factfinding need not cause us to reject the 
synthesis suggested here. We certainly know, by introspection if 
nothing else, that people required to explain some event or evi-
dence are able to restrict their attention to the most pertinent and 
promising potential accounts-at least, they believe they are doing 
that-and we need not know exactly how this is done in order to 
formulate decision criteria in probabilistic terms. Perhaps some 
rough and ready rules of thumb will emerge to the effect that, for 
the practical purposes of law, only the three or five most plausible 
stories need be considered, and perhaps we can adjudicate using 
practical reason without having to explain just how the jury identi-
fies these most plausible stories starting from the two that the 
'"An instructive example in the criminal context is that of the innocent defendant 
who is not willing to incriminate the person he knows to be guilty but who does not 
want to go to jail himself. The prosecution's story might well be twenty times more 
likely than the best story such a defendant is willing to produce, even though the jury 
can identify a quite plausible story (incriminating a third person) that is not advocated 
by either side. 
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parties present. Any such rule of thumb, however, would remain in 
the domain of inferential practice. It need not be a part of the for-
mal decision criterion, if only because we can rely on the common 
sense of the jury in implementing it, and it should not be a part of 
such a criterion because we would have enormous difficulty articu-
lating such an idea in a way that would not unnecessarily restrict 
the free play of inferential thinking that is critical to effective deci-
sionmaking. 
III. BAYES IAN ANALYSIS OF PROBATIVE VALUE 
A. Bayes' Theorem Applied to Trials 
Another branch of decision theory relates not to the burden of 
persuasion criterion but rather to the analysis of the probative 
value of evidence. Bayes' Theorem, derived from the axioms of 
probability, relates the assessment of the probability of an event 
given certain information to the assessment of the probability of 
the same event without such information.129 Let P( G) represent the 
'
2
' The referenced axioms are the so-called Kolmogorov axioms, formal 
requirements of a system of probability measurement that prevent self-defeating sets 
of beliefs about uncertainty. See, e.g., Brian Skyrms, Choice and Chance: An 
Introduction to Inductive Logic 168-98 (2d ed. 1975). Not all scholars believe that this 
system of probability is the correct one to use in thinking about problems of inductive 
inference, especially problems like inference in legal trials. The best known such 
challenge is that of Jonathan Cohen. See Cohen, supra note 67. The argument 
presented by Cohen and those who endorse his view tends to focus on the problem of 
evidential incompleteness. The idea is that when we have very littleevidence about 
the occurrence of an event, A, then we are not warranted in giving a high level of 
probability to either A or not-A. Id. at 33-47, 74-86, 171-81, 219-24, 270-73. This 
argument seems to conflict with one of the fundamental axioms or theorems of 
mathematical probability, namely that, for any event A, P(A) + P(not-A) = 1, which 
requires that when P(A) is low (close to 0), P(not-A) must be high (close to 1). See, 
e.g., Alex Stein, Judicial Fact-finding and the Bayesian Method: The Case for Deeper 
Skepticism About Their Combination, 1 Int'l J. Evidence & Proof 25, 28-33, 41-43 
(1997). The matter is too complicated to address here in detail, but my present view is 
that this critique of the use of mathematical probabilities, and a fortiori of Bayes' 
Theorem, in the legal context fails to distinguish between (1) the issue of whether it is 
justifiable to make an assessment of probability for a given decision task on the 
evidence then available and (2) the question of what probability to assign if 
assignment is to be made. See Nance, supra note 46, at 625 (drawing the indicated 
distinction, arguing that it is the trial judge's duty to assure that the evidence is 
~ufficiently complete to warrant submission of the case to the trier of fact for decision 
m accordance with an assessment of probability, and recommending how the trial 
judge should discharge that duty as part of the burden of production). 
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probability that the facts would be such that defendant is guilty (or 
liable), considered without regard to a particular piece of evidence, 
E, and let P( GIE) represent the probability of guilt taking E into 
consideration. Further, let P(EIG) represent the conditional prob-
ability, assessed without regard to the fact that it is received, that 
the evidence E would be received given that the defendant is guilty 
in fact, and P(Einot-G) represent the conditional probability, as-
sessed without regard to the fact that it is received, that the 
evidence E would be received given that the defendant is not guilty 
in fact. Then under Bayes' Theorem: 
P(GIE) = {P(G) xP(EIG)} + {[P(G) xP(ElG)] + [P(not-G) xP(Einot-G)]} 
A mathematically equivalent, but more transparent and often more 
useful version of the rule is: 
O(GIE) = O(G) x L 0 (E) 
or in words, 
posterior odds = prior odds x likelihood ratio 
where O(G) is the "prior odds" of guilt (or liability), which is the 
ratio of P( G) to P(not-G), 0( GIE) is the "posterior odds" of such 
guilt (liability), or the ratio of P( GIE) to P(not-GIE), and L 0 (E) is 
the "likelihood ratio" for evidence E relative to the hypothesis G, 
or the ratio of P(EIG) to P(Einot-G). The likelihood ratio repre-
sents the relative compatibility of the evidence E with the two 
competing hypotheses, G and not-G, and constitutes a measure of 
the probative value of E relative to these hypotheses.130 
130 A more detailed statement of the theorem, explicitly taking into account 
background information affecting the conditional probabilities, can be found in 
C.G.G. Aitken, Statistics and the Evaluation of Evidence for Forensic Scientists 
§ 2.5.1, at 46-50 (1995). A similar treatment may be found in Ian W. Evett & Bruce S. 
Weir, Interpreting DNA Evidence: Statistical Genetics for Forensic Scientists 22-29 
(1998). 
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In theory, one can iterate this equation for each piece of evi-
dence considered, so that the entire case could be represented by 
an equation of the following sort: 
where E now represents the total package of n items of evidence 
received, £ 1 through En, where La(EiiE) is defined in the obvious 
way, as the ratio of P(EiiG and E) to P(Eilnot-G and Ej), and 
where 0( G) now represents the odds in favor of guilt (liability) 
without any evidence, or at least any evidence on contested facts. 131 
This equation does not assume that the Ei are presented to the de-
cisionmaker in any particular temporal order, nor does it assume 
that there is a unique decomposition of the total evidence into n 
pieces. In the general case, however, the likelihood ratio associated 
with a particular piece of evidence does depend on what other evi-
dence has already been taken into account. That is, it depends on 
the sequence in which evidence is taken into account (rather than 
the sequence in which the evidence is presented). For example, if 
one item of evidence is that the perpetrator, like the defendant, 
was tall, the value of the likelihood ratio for that evidence can de-
pend on whether this evidence is considered first, as E1 , or 
considered second, as E,. If considered second, after the considera-
tion of evidence that the perpetrator (like the defendant) was male, 
the likelihood ratio for "perpetrator-was-tall" is smaller than it 
would be if the reasoner has not already taken into account "per-
petrator-was-male." At the same time, the likelihood ratio for the 
combination of the two items of evidence (such as that the perpe-
IJJ Characterizing 0( G) presents some interesting problems, especially in view of 
the )resumption of innocence" in criminal cases. The obvious problem is that some 
consider the natural meaning of "presumption of innocence" to be a prior probability 
of zer?. In that case, 0( G) = 0, and no evidence, no matter how probative, can raise 
the pnor probability, resulting in a posterior odds and posterior probability of zero as 
well. A number of strategies have been suggested for dealing with this problem. 
Comp~re, e.g., Posner, supra note 12, at 1514 (stating that an unbiased juror should 
st~rt With one to one odds of guilt in a criminal case or liability in a civil case), with 
Richard D. Friedman, A Presumption of Innocence, Not of Even Odds, 52 Stan. L. 
Rev. 87~ (2000) (criticizing Posner's account of starting odds and employing instead 
the factfmder's hypothetical pre-indictment, pre-arrest assessment of the odds of the 
defendant's guilt). 
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trator, like the defendant, was a tall male) is not affected by the or-
der in which its two pieces are taken into account. Moreover, if two 
items of evidence are stochastically independent, then the likeli-
hood ratio of each is unaffected by the sequence in which they are 
taken into account, ceteris paribus. Thus, if E1 through En are mu-
tually independent, then the iterative equation presented above 
simplifies132 to: 
Whether or not the E; are mutually independent, in theory the final 
0( GIE) should not depend on how the individuation occurs or in 
what order the evidence is presented or considered, although in 
practice such differences might matter psychologically.133 
Much has been written in the last twenty years or so about the 
usefulness of this kind of representation of the assessment of evi-
dence at trial. 134 On the one hand, even its staunchest proponents 
do not claim that the equation represents a complete account of 
the process of assessing P( GIE), whether as a descriptive or pre-
scriptive matter. In particular, it is well understood that neither 
Bayes' Theorem, nor any of the many other theorems derived from 
the axioms of probability, determine by themselves the value of 
P( G) or the likelihood ratios, and consequently, they cannot de-
termine P( GIE). Rather, those theorems provide normative 
consistency constraints on the assessment of such magnitudes.135 On 
the other hand, even its staunchest opponents do not categorically 
deny that Bayes' Theorem might be useful in at least some ways in 
thinking about the assessment of evidence at trial, though they con-
m See Aitken, supra note 130, § 5.1.3, at 110-16. 
133 The stated psychological qualification, if true, merely implies what no Bayesian 
denies: that Bayes' Theorem is not a complete account of the actual inference 
processes that take place at trial. 
134 A symposium addressing these issues, organized by Professor Allen, appeared as 
a special issue of a (then) new journal. Symposium, 1 Int'l J. Evidence & Proof 253 
(1997). An impressive book length treatment is David A. Schum, The Evidential 
Foundations of Probabilistic Reasoning (1994 ). 
135 See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Towards a (Bayesian) Convergence?, 1 Int'l J. 
Evidence & Proof 348, 349-51 (1997). 
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tinue to express strong skepticism.136 Rather, they see the consis-
tency constraints as simply too weak to be of any serious help in 
modeling, descriptively or prescriptively, the actual inferences of 
factfinders. 137 
Given this state of the debate, one might argue that there is little 
left to say besides the discussion of particular analyses proposed by 
those who consider Bayes' Theorem useful. In one respect, how-
ever, Allen and Leiter might well be expected to see some general 
value in attending to likelihood ratios. Bayesian analysis is just as 
compatible with the relative plausibility model advocated by Allen 
and Leiter as it is with an expected utility theory of the burden of 
persuasion. Indeed, many Bayesian analysts consider it very useful, 
as a practical matter, to specify a competing hypothesis (story) in 
place of the more abstract competing hypothesis ''not guilty" or 
"not liable" (that is, not-G). It is often easier to assess the likeli-
hood ratio for particular evidence if the defendant articulates a 
theory of the case and one can restrict attention to that particular 
story instantiating "not guilty."138 Despite this seeming affinity, Al-
len and Leiter continue to argue generally against the use of Bayes' 
Theorem in analyzing evidence at trial.139 Accordingly, some brief 
responses of comparable generality are in order. 
B. Some Responses to Allen and Leiter's General Arguments 
In their paper, Allen and Leiter briefly reiterate several claims 
about the use of Bayes' Theorem in the juridical context. First, 
they argue that such Bayesianism founders on the problem of 
136 This is made clear in Allen and Leiter's discussion of Posner's use of Bayesian 
analysis. See Allen & Leiter, supra note 1, at 1519-20. 
137 See, e.g., Allen, supra note 58. This point is made particularly well, and succinctly, 
in Craig R. Callen, Computation and Juridical Proof, 1 Int'l J. Evidence & Proof 296 
(1997). There is an interesting parallel here with the difference between those who 
see formal justice, the idea that the law should treat like cases alike, as an empty 
concept, and those who attribute significant force to it in shaping the law. Compare 
Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537 (1982) (treating 
formal justice as an empty concept), with Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986) 
(attributing significant force to formal justice). 
138 See Bernard Robertson & G.A. Vignaux, Interpreting Evidence: Evaluating 
Forensic Science in the Courtroom 33-50 (1995) (discussing the problem of 
identifying the "alternative hypothesis"). 
139 Allen & Leiter, supra note 1, at 1507-10. 
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computational complexity-that to actually carry out the computa-
tions implicated by Bayes' Theorem for any ordinary litigated case 
would be impossibly complex.140 This frequently stated objection 
has always struck me as oddly misdirected. If the point is simply to 
counsel against a general practice of having the jury try to analyze 
the entire mass of evidence in a case by explicitly using the theo-
rem and (presumably) a calculator to obtain a precise posterior 
probability, then the point is correct but not particularly interest-
ing. Such a procedure is obviously impractical, and no Bayesian 
enthusiast of whom I am aware suggests that we implement it. 141 It 
does not follow from that point, however, that Bayes' Theorem is 
not useful, either descriptively or prescriptively, in modeling jury 
decisionmaking. 
Consider the descriptive issue. Is it true that a process with a 
measurable output cannot be usefully described by a formal model 
unless there exists within the modeled process an intelligence ca-
pable of performing the calculations presented in the model? 
Clearly not. Physical systems are often modeled in science with 
theories requiring considerable computation even when the physi-
cal system does not, to our knowledge, contain any intelligence at 
all, much less an intelligence capable of performing the necessary 
calculations. Even if a human intelligence is present and operating 
in the modeled process, the model, to be useful, does not need to 
be one that the modeled intelligence can or does consciously em-
ploy. Think of the physics of riding a bicycle or throwing a 
basebal1.142 Indeed, the formal representation of the heuristics used 
in practical decisionmaking can be, and often is, quite complex.143 
That does not mean that we cannot learn about the decisionmaking 
process by developing such complex representations, even if many 
140 Id. at 1507. 
141 Of course, this does not rule out as necessarily impractical the use of Bayes' 
Theorem in court, in a limited class of cases, to illustrate the probative value of 
certain evidence. This is discussed infra Section III.D. 
142 Cf. Friedman, supra note 117, at 289 ("[W]hen thinking well-and with the aid of 
whatever simplifications and heuristics may be necessary-factfinders reach results 
that are roughly consistent with those they would reach if they were to apply 
probability theory rigorously. They do not have to think about the theory consciously, 
just as an athlete does not have to think about the laws of physics in determining 
where a ball hurtling through the air is likely to land on the ground."). 
143 See generally Gigerenzer et al., supra note 57 (examining various heuristics). 
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of those who employ the heuristics are incapable of understanding 
the corresponding representation. 
Turning to the prescriptive issue, the objection might be made 
that such models, at least to the extent that they are not and cannot 
be employed by the modeled intelligence, are radically separated 
from that intelligence, so that the model is useful only "from the 
outside," for an observer of the process. Any appraisal done by 
such an observer must be merely passive: It cannot, the objection 
would go, tell the modeled intelligence anything of practical utility 
that might improve the results of the activity being modeled. But 
this is simply not so, as the physics of bicycle riding or baseball 
throwing could illustrate. An analyst could use tools that the intel-
ligence being modeled does not or could not use, at least not 
explicitly, to reach recommendations about how the modeled activ-
ity can be improved. Similarly, the success or failure of a bridge can 
be analyzed using a particular model whether or not the designers 
or builders of the bridge were even aware of the model, as when an 
ancient design is studied using modern theories, and the results in 
turn can be used to improve modern bridge building. Moreover, 
even a limited degree of understanding of the model by a modeled 
intelligence can sometimes be of use in the actual decision process 
even if precise computations are infeasible. An engineer, for ex-
ample, can make simplifying assumptions that make practical the 
computation of parameters for the construction of a bridge. Simply 
being familiar with the basic logic or structure of the formalizations 
of bridge construction theory can provide important insights for 
the designer or builder without requiring any serious calculations 
at all.144 The variety of potentially helpful information feedback 
144 In a similar vein, Richard Friedman illustrates various useful general propositions 
about evidence, derived from Bayes' Theorem, the use of which requires no explicit 
calculation: 
1. All other things being equal, the more probable a proposition appears 
without consideration of a given body of evidence, the more probable it will 
appear upon consideration of that evidence. 
2. All other things being equal, the more probable it appears that a given body 
of evidence would arise given the truth of a proposition, the more probable the 
proposition will appear given the body of evidence. 
3. All other things being equal, the less probable it appears that a given body of 
evidence would arise given the falsity of a proposition, the more probable the 
proposition will appear given the body of evidence. 
Friedman, supra note 135, at 350. 
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mechanisms, between modeled intelligence and model builders, is 
considerable. 
It is thus odd how intensely skeptical the anti-Bayesians are 
about the ability to identify useful formalisms for the juridical 
world. It is as if someone had said to Newton: 
How foolish you are to think that you can gain insight into the 
motions of physical objects with an equation like f = ma. It may 
be theoretically interesting, but you'll never be able to apply it 
in the real world, with all its enormous complexities, with 
countless forces acting on any object and an inability to capture 
precise initial conditions at some fixed point in time. What is 
more, nearly all the objects you think are governed by this 
equation cannot possibly do any of the required calculations, so 
how can they know how fast to accelerate! 
As this reductio suggests, in the end one must look to the results 
that are generated by models to see if they are useful rather than 
ruling out the enterprise on a priori considerations such as compu-
tational complexity. Maybe, however, the argument from 
computational complexity is really aimed at a different point. To 
assess this possibility, I turn to the other general arguments men-
tioned by Allen and Leiter. 
Allen and Leiter's second argument is that trials do not proceed 
in the manner contemplated by Bayesian revisions of probability. 
That is, trials do not proceed by the jury assigning a prior probabil-
ity, introducing some new evidence, reassessing the probability of 
guilt, introducing further new evidence, reassessing the probability 
of guilt, and so on. Rather, the jury assesses the likelihood of guilt, 
or the parties' stories, only after all the evidence is in; at that point 
there is no "prior" probability, there is only "posterior" probabil-
ity. 145 Like many anti-Bayesian arguments, this one has, at least to 
some extent, created a straw man to attack. Despite the somewhat 
misleading conventional terminology referring to "prior" and "pos-
terior" probabilities, Bayes' Theorem does not say anything about 
when the assessments of probability are made, nor does it assume 
the evidence is assessed in the order in which it is presented to the 
trier of fact. One can apply Bayes' Theorem after all evidence has 
been introduced and considered. It is simply a way of decomposing 
145 Allen & Leiter, supra note 1, at 1507-08. 
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the evidence considered, and as noted above, there is no unique 
• • 146 decompositiOn. 
This might not seem to be responsive to the point Allen and Le-
iter are making, as it merely shifts the problem of adjusting for 
complex dependencies to a different sequence of evidence. Allen 
and Leiter might still reject as unrealistic the idea of sequential 
evaluation, whatever sequence is selected. But even if that sequen-
tial evaluation were required to replicate in some close way the 
actual psychological states of the jurors in reaching a decision-an 
unnecessary restriction-allowing for flexibility to rearrange the 
order in which evidence is assimilated presents intriguing possibili-
ties more compatible with a holistic approach. For example, 
strategies may exist that allow jurors to reduce the complexity of 
the task by grouping particular pieces of evidence in simplifying 
ways.147 Such strategies may be more or less conscious and could 
utilize evolved heuristics for processing complex information. All 
this remains to be explored, and it is too constraining of inquiry to 
reject such possibilities a priori on the ground that equations like 
those presented above do not look like what jurors are doing when 
they think about a case. 
In any event, nothing about Bayesian formalisms requires that 
every item of evidence be evaluated explicitly in Bayesian terms. In 
particular, Bayes' Theorem can be used simply to illustrate how the 
prescriptive effect of a single item (or collection of items) of evi-
dence can be extracted from that of all the rest. To employ Bayes' 
Theorem utilizing a "prior probability" relative to a particular item 
146 Allen and Leiter comment in a footnote that their second argument is more 
forceful when applied to the problem of "discovery" than to the problem of 
"justification," but they claim that "the task at trial is more analogous to discovery 
than justification." Allen & Leiter, supra note 1, at 1508 n.51. To the contrary, the 
presentation of evidence at trial is decidedly justificatory, especially in an adversarial 
?Ystem in which each side tries to justify inferences favorable to that side. Moreover, 
JUT~rs at trial must not only form (that is, "discover") beliefs about the likelihood of 
vanou~ events, but they must as a practical matter be prepared to offer justifications 
to their fellow jurors for those beliefs during deliberations-----deliberations that can 
c~ange an assessment that appears to be irrational. At each of these stages of 
discovery and justification, Bayesian decomposition of the evidence can potentially 
play a part. 
147 Fo: example, two items of evidence that have the effect of canceling each other 
~Ut rmght be grouped together and then ignored. I am indebted to Bernard 
obertson for suggesting this line of thought. 
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of evidence, it suffices that the person employing it be able to ar-
ticulate and answer the question, "What would I believe if I did not 
have that item of evidence but I did have all the rest?"148 This al-
lows one to assess the likelihood ratio for that item (or collection 
of items) as if it were the last piece of evidence taken into account. 
The likelihood ratio measures the marginal contribution of that 
piece of evidence to the entire evidence package.149 
The third argument recited by Allen and Leiter emphasizes a 
point conceded by Bayesians, that Bayes' Theorem provides only a 
set of consistency constraints on probability assessments and so 
cannot be enough, by itself, to generate the posterior probability of 
interest. Defending Bayesian analysis, Friedman has commented 
on the limited significance of this point as follows: "[T]his consid-
eration does not undermine the value of the theory-any more 
than the laws of physics are rendered useless because they do not 
reveal the mass of a given object but only indicate what happens in 
prescribed conditions to an object of a given mass. "150 But because 
what is "constrained" by such probability theory is a set of subjec-
tive probabilities, Allen and Leiter remain unconvinced by such 
replies: 
[I]ndividuals can begin from radically different perspectives, 
and each, in Bayesian terms, will be operating equally ration-
ally. Bayes' Theorem provides no method of adjudicating such 
differences and thus cannot offer useful guidance for factfind-
ers. In other contexts, such as science, these differences may be 
marginalized by convergence theorems that demonstrate that 
over time and with enough new evidence the divergent initial 
148 Of course, one must be alert to the fact that framing the question this way may 
introduce the kind of distortion associated with hindsight bias. See generally Scott A. 
Hawkins & Reid Hastie, Hindsight: Biased Judgments of Past Events After the 
Outcomes Are Known, 107 Psycho!. Bull. 311 (1990) (reviewing empirical evidence of 
this phenomenon). 
149 It is conceivable, of course, that isolating a single item of evidence for analysis in 
this fashion might somehow be incompatible with a more holistic evaluation of all the 
evidence. For example, the former might fail to capture some aspect of the evidence 
that is useful under the heuristics by which the latter is performed. But merely being 
able to conceive of such a possibility is not enough to rule out of bounds the type of 
isolating analysis discussed in the text; that would take some greater showing that 
such analysis would yield results, such as the exclusion of evidence, that would distort 
the jurors' understanding in a way that is, on balance, veritistically counterproductive. 
15° Friedman, supra note 135, at 350. 
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starting points will wash out and the result will converge on the 
truth. There is nothing even remotely analogous to this in the 
condition of trials.151 
Is this true? At the individual level, we do have the beginnings of 
some convergence results, results that tie subjective assessments to 
accurate results. Alvin Goldman provides the following commen-
tary in his recent book, in a section strikingly entitled, "A Veritistic 
Rationale for Bayesian Inference": 
Good inference procedures alone do not guarantee veritistically 
good outputs; one also needs good factual inputs .... No deduc-
tive method can pledge to a reasoner that its use will guarantee 
true conclusions. Only a more modest claim can be made: true 
conclusions will follow if the reasoner's premises are true .... 
If this is the strongest claim that can be made on behalf of 
deductive inference, more can hardly be expected from induc-
tive or probabilistic inference. One should be pleased to find 
any analogous property in the latter domains. Precisely such an 
analogous property is what Bayesian inference can be shown to 
possess, under [certain) assumptions .... [W)hat I shall show 
(roughly) is that when a reasoner starts with accurate likeli-
hoods [that is, accurate likelihood ratios] (analogous to true 
premises), it is objectively probable that Bayesian inference will 
increase his degree of knowledge (truth possession) of the tar-
• • 152 get propositiOn. 
Goldman's main point is that this tendency toward "truth pos-
session"-a variable property that essentially means assigning high 
subjective probabilities to propositions that are true and low sub-
jective probabilities to propositions that are false-does not 
depend on the magnitude of the individual's prior (subjective) 
probability about the target proposition.153 This result, which 
151 Allen & Leiter, supra note 1, at 1508. 
152 Goldman, supra note 43, at 115-16. Goldman subsequently states his results in 
the form of two theorems. Id. at 121-22. 
153 Goldman further summarizes his result: 
We do not assume, however, that the reasoner begins with a particularly good 
or bad estimate of the truth or falsity of X [the target proposition]. Indeed, our 
analysis will show that wherever she starts-whatever her prior probabilities for 
X and for NOT-X-application of Bayes' Theorem to derive a posterior 
probability in light of the witness's testimony leads to an (objectively) expected 
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Goldman illustrates after the quoted passage, obviously depends 
on the assumption that subjective juror likelihood ratios are objec-
tively accurate. In that respect, the demonstration is incomplete.154 
But it is just the sort of thing Allen and Leiter appear to demand 
from Bayesians. To carry the matter further and address the accu-
racy of a juror's likelihood ratios, one would need to look to the 
effects of experience (including the effects of natural selection and 
cultural evolution) and, when expertise is helpful, to the effects of 
expert assistance. In terms of "adjudicating" differences among in-
dividuals, including jurors, one would also need to look to the 
effects of interpersonal dialogue, such as jury deliberation. 
These are just the beginnings, as I said, but this discussion sug-
gests that the situation for Bayesianism, though certainly complex, 
is not nearly so hopeless as Allen and Leiter suggest-at least as 
long as one does not demand too much of the rules of inductive in-
ference. As Goldman's statement serves to emphasize, we do not 
reject the juridical use of rules of deductive logic, either as bases 
for argument by counsel or as tools of persuasion by jurors in de-
liberations, even though merely conforming to such rules does not 
guarantee accuracy of results. The same is true of Bayes' Theorem 
and the general results of probability theory of which Bayes' Theo-
rem is a part. Carefully employed, they are tools with potential 
value in the very process that Allen and Leiter recommend, 
namely, the "painstaking attention to and examination of the evi-
dence and its logical and empirical implications. "155 
I hope that what I have said, together with similar comments by 
others, will help to defuse the general attack on Bayesian thinking 
as a tool of probably limited but not insignificant-and still under-
explored-utility. In the following two Sections, I turn to the 
increase in her truth possession. (More precisely, this holds so long as her prior 
probabilities are neither 0 nor 1.0, and the likelihood ratio is not identical to 
1.0.) 
Id. at 118. 
154 Most importantly, the meanings of terms like "objective probability" and 
"objectively accurate likelihood ratios" require elaboration. See id. at 117. Goldman 
has undertaken this elaboration in an intriguing recent paper. See Alvin I. Goldman, 
Quasi-Objective Bayesianism and Legal Evidence (2001) (unpublished manuscript, 
on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). 
155 Allen & Leiter, supra note 1, at 1509. Obviously, some particular uses of 
Bayesian analysis might present the "allure of the false hope" Allen and Leiter fear. 
ld. That can only be assessed in the context of the particular suggested uses. 
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residual undertaking, suggesting specific applications of Bayesian 
analysis that show value in the juridical context. I offer these as the 
testimony of someone who by no means considers Bayesian analy-
sis to be the only useful tool. Conversely, there are other possible 
sources of value in the Bayesian approach, so I do not claim to ex-
haust the possibilities. Instead, I focus on the sources of value that 
I have encountered in my work as a teacher and as a scholar. 
C. Bayes' Theorem as an Analytical Tool for Lawyers 
As already noted, critics of Bayesian analysis, including Allen 
and Leiter, do not deny that such analysis might serve as a useful 
heuristic for some purposes other than modeling the actual infer-
ence process at trial. Such purposes might include informing a 
lawyer's analysis of relevance and probative value in the context of 
decisions about conducting discovery, arguing to the judge about 
admissibility, arguing to the jury about weight, or arguing before a 
rulemaking authority about the rules of admissibility. A number of 
scholars have thought this kind of analysis is useful enough to jus-
tify the effort to undertake it.156 I will not reexamine the arguments 
made by such individuals; their work speaks for itself. Rather, in 
this short section, I want to indicate what I have learned about the 
pedagogical utility of Bayesian analysis. 
When students in a basic evidence course are asked to assess the 
relevance or probative value of some item of evidence offered by 
the prosecution in a criminal case, the all too common classroom 
response is to say that the evidence is (or is not) relevant because 
the evidence does (or does not) make it more likely than not that 
the defendant committed the alleged crime. When pressed on the 
matter, students will see that this verbalization is imprecise since 
relevance does not mean that the evidence in question causes the 
ultimate fact of interest to reach any particular level of probability; 
it only means that the probability is affected.157 They will correct 
themselves by stating that the evidence is (or is not) relevant be-
156 See, e.g., V.C. Ball, The Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards of 
Proof, 14 Vand. L. Rev. 807 (1961); Richard Friedman, Character Impeachment 
Evidence: Psycho--Bayesian [!?] Analysis and a Proposed Overhaul, 38 UCLA L. 
Rev. 637 (1991); Kaplan, supra note 46; Richard 0. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 
Mich. L. Rev. 1021 (1977). 
157 See Fed. R. Evid. 401. 
1608 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 87:1551 
cause it does (or does not) make the defendant's guilt more likely 
than it would be without the evidence. So far, so good. But when 
students are pressed to explain why that is so, they often have little 
or no ability to support their conclusion except to say that it seems 
that way to them. 
For example, consider evidence by a witness that defendant was 
observed running from the scene of a crime as the police ap-
proached. Students readily assess this evidence as relevant but 
often have difficulty articulating just why. When pressed, they will 
sometimes say that running from the scene shows the defendant's 
desire not to be caught for having committed the crime. When 
pressed to explain whether it might show something else, they will 
begin to give explicit attention to alternative hypotheses. Was the 
defendant scared of the police for reasons having nothing to do 
with the crime at issue? Did he have reason to be? Might he have 
been afraid of retaliation if he were forced to give evidence against 
the true perpetrator? And so on. Students then come to see that 
the probative value is dependent on the relative strength of the 
consciousness-of-guilt explanation and the other possibilities. 
Without ever seeing a formula on the blackboard, students have 
thus internalized a more explicit understanding of the core concept 
of Bayesian thinking. They are examining the relative plausibility 
of competing explanations of the particular evidence, just as Bayes' 
Theorem suggests they should. 158 Having been sensitized to the 
need for such inquiry, students often can employ it in other con-
texts. For example, when subsequently presented with a personal 
injury case in which there is evidence that the plaintiff attempted to 
suborn perjury from a witness to support his claim, students are 
much quicker to look for explanations of such an attempt other 
than the obvious one. In the case that I use, it is not difficult to find 
information supporting such an alternative theory of the plaintiff's 
behavior, once one thinks to look for it. 159 Such an inquiry provides 
158 I have found that obtaining such internalization before presenting the formula (or 
even without ever presenting the formula) decreases student resistance to the idea 
presented, just as illustrating Coase 's Theorem without ever stating it improves 
student understanding by decreasing resistance. 
159 The case is McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d 916 (3d Cir. 1985). It 
presents the possibility that the plaintiff, while in the right on the merits, was moved 
to subornation because he worried that his legitimate claim might be frustrated in the 
courts by the defendant's unscrupulous delaying tactics. See id. at 919 n.2. 
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the student with a basis for arguing that the evidence of suborna-
tion is, if not irrelevant, at least less probative than might at first 
glance appear, making more plausible an admissibility argument 
based on the risk of unfair prejudice or an argument to the trier of 
fact that the evidence should not be given much weight. 
Obviously, this framework does not provide complete answers to 
the questions that must be addressed in assessing probative value. 
Knowing that one should compare P(EIG) with P(Elnot-G) does 
not answer the question of what the magnitudes of these probabili-
ties are or even what their ratio is. Once again, Bayes' Theorem is 
not a complete guide to the justification of conclusions about rele-
vance or weight, but it is a useful starting point. Moreover, as 
already noted, the Bayesian comparison is one that should be at-
tractive to Allen and Leiter, in light of their emphasis on the 
relative plausibility theory. A focus on the likelihood ratio invites. 
just the kind of comparative assessment that the relative plausibil-
ity theory encourages, now directed at the question of the 
probative value of a particular piece of evidence. 
When one turns to scientific evidence, this kind of analysis be-
comes even more important. I have been teaching courses on 
scientific evidence for the last three years, and I have found that 
once students are exposed to Bayesian analysis, they are better 
able to spot certain issues relating to the assessment of the proba-
tive value of such evidence. To take the obvious case, if an expert 
offers to testify that a biological "mark" found at the scene of a 
crime (a blood type, for example) "matches" the corresponding 
characteristic of the accused, students familiar with Bayesian think-
ing naturally pose the question of what circumstances or events, 
consistent with innocence, would explain the report of a match, 
and then inquire how likely such circumstances or events are as 
compared to the report of a match for an accused who is guilty. 
Less obviously, if an expert offers to testify that a defendant or an 
alleged victim displays behavioral features "characteristic" of a 
battered person syndrome, familiarity with Bayesian analysis 
prompts attention to the question of whether those features are 
also present in those who do not fit the syndrome and, if so, 
whether the expert can speak meaningfully to the relative fre-
quency with which the feature appears among those who do and 
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those who do not fall within the syndrome category-and if not, 
what significance the court should attach to that fact. 
I will provide no further illustrations, because few if any Baye-
sioskeptics, as they are often called, deny the potential usefulness 
of thinking in these terms.160 If they have any objection to this kind 
of use, it would seem to be that students and lawyers can appreci-
ate the importance of asking the questions suggested above 
without ever attending to the Bayesian formalisms.161 To that point, 
I would reply pragmatically: My experience has been that students 
do not tend to identify such questions as readily without being sen-
sitized, at least implicitly, to the Bayesian framework. 162 The fact 
that there l1light be other ways to elicit comparable insights from 
students as readily does not negate the utility of this one. Of 
course, I concede that this is anecdotal evidence on pedagogical 
value put forth without the benefit of any systematic learning ex-
periment or detailed knowledge of the relevant experience of other 
evidence teachers in this regard. 
D. Bayes' Theorem Used to Assess or Assist the Jury's Evaluation 
of Evidence 
There is general recognition that a Bayesian analysis might, at 
least in theory, be useful in the context of scientific evidence with 
an explicitly statistical component. For example, it was suggested 
many years ago that Bayes' Theorem might be used to convey the 
significance of the "random match probability" for forensic identi-
fication evidence used in criminal trials.163 In a case in which a 
defendant matches a mark (for example, DNA profile or blood 
type) found at the scene of the crime, the random match probabil-
ity is simply the chance that, though innocent, the defendant 
160 Indeed, one may plausibly infer that Allen considers the Bayesian paradigm to 
have significant pedagogical value since he includes a substantial discussion of it in his 
excellent casebook for the basic evidence course. See Ronald J. Allen et al., Evidence: 
Text, Cases, and Problems 191-97 (2d ed. 1997). 
161 This seems to be one of the arguments made by Professor Craig Callen. See 
Callen, supra note 137, at 298. 
162 As noted above, "implicit" sensitization may be more effective than "explicit," if 
by "explicit" one means actually writing a formula on the blackboard. See supra note 
158. 
163 Michael 0. Finkelstein & William B. Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to 
Identification Evidence, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 489,502 (1970). 
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would-by mere coincidence-match that mark. This, in tum, is es-
timated by reference to the frequency of that mark in an appropriate 
suspect population.164 This random match probability is a part of 
what contributes to the denominator of the likelihood ratio for the 
testimony reporting a match. Put another way, it is the denomina-
tor of the likelihood ratio for the proposition that there is a match 
relative to the hypothesis that the defendant is the source of the 
mark at the crime scene.165 
The idea of Bayesian assistance is that jurors might be told the 
relative likelihood of getting a match under the hypothesis that the 
defendant is the source as compared to that of getting a match un-
der the hypothesis that someone else (unknown and therefore 
statistically random as to the mark) is the source. For a random 
match probability of 0.04 (meaning that one out of twenty-five 
people on average share that mark), as an example, the expert 
would report to the jury that it is twenty-five times more likely that 
there would be a match if the defendant is the source than if some 
other unknown person is the source. (This presentation format will 
be called the "likelihood ratio format" in what follows.) Addition-
ally, the same (or another) expert might illustrate for the jury the 
effect this likelihood ratio should have on various prior probabili-
ties that the defendant is the source of the mark. That is, the jury 
might be shown a chart like the following, mapping prior probabili-
ties (expressed as a percentage) to posterior probabilities for a 
likelihood ratio of twenty-five: 
164 Ian Evett and Bruce Weir make admirably clear the complexity of the attribution 
of a random match probability, without using that terminology. Evett & Weir, supra 
note 130, at 22-28. 
165 The numerator for this likelihood ratio is just 1, because it is (essentially) certain 
that defendant will match the mark at the scene if in fact it came from him. When 
taken together with the probability of a false positive laboratory error for an innocent 
defendant, the random match probability generates the denominator of the 
(different) likelihood ratio for the proposition that the forensic scientist found a 
match relative to the hypothesis that the defendant is the source of the mark at the 
crime scene. To obtain the denominator of the (still different) likelihood ratio for the 
evidence, which is a testimonial or documentary report of a match relative to the 
hypothesis of defendant's guilt, one must further take into account the chance of the 
expert witness lying, the chance of someone planting the mark at the scene to frame 
the defendant, the chance of there being an innocent explanation of the fact that the 
defendant is the source of the mark at the scene, and so forth. See Jonathan J. 
Koehler et al., The Random Match Probability in DNA Evidence: Irrelevant and 
Prejudicial?, 35 Jurimetrics J. 201,203-05 (1995). 
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(This presentation method will be called the "chart format" in 
what follows.) Neither the likelihood ratio format nor the chart 
format is commonly employed at this time in criminal cases in the 
United States, although they do appear in civil paternity cases and 
the occasional criminal case in which paternity is material.166 Most 
criminal courts, however, allow the presentation of the random 
match statistic, expressed either as a probability (for example, 0.04) 
or as a frequency (1 in 25, or 4% ).167 (These conventional presenta-
tion methods will be called variations of a "frequencies format.") 
160 See 1 David L. Faigman et al., Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and Science 
of Expert Testimony§§ 15-5.4 to 15-5.5, at 656-59 (1997). 
167 See 1 id. § 15-5.3, at 652-56. 
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The question of the best way to present such evidence to a jury 
is, in significant part, an empirical question. Allen and Leiter con-
cur discussing research done by Professor Jonathan Koehler on 
the' ability of jurors properly to evaluate evidence about random 
match probabilities.168 Interestingly, given Allen and Leiter's orien-
tation, that research does not directly address the question of 
greatest interest from a veritistic perspective, namely how to pre-
sent the evidence to a jury so as to obtain the most accurate 
results. 169 A considerable body of other reported research, not dis-
cussed by Allen and Leiter, does address this question. Interestingly 
enough, it uses a Bayesian benchmark for what an accurate assess-
ment of the evidence would be.170 This research has generally 
supported two conclusions relevant here. First, regardless of for-
mat used, mock jurors tend to undervalue forensic match evidence, 
1 ~" Allen & Leiter, supra note 1, at 1543-45 (discussing Koehler et al., supra note 
165). 
169 The results generated by Koehler and his colleagues lend credence to the idea 
that jurors may need to be controlled by the exclusion of evidence about very small 
random match probabilities, those that are dominated by much higher rates of false 
positive lab errors, because jurors seem to be irrationally impressed by small random 
match probabilities in such contexts. Because of limitations inherent in the research, 
Allen and Leiter express appropriate caution about the wisdom of an exclusionary 
rule, id. at 1543-45, but it is easy to understand why Allen and Leiter, who emphasize 
the jury control principle, would find appealing an interpretation of the results that 
characterizes the jury as misled by the random match probability. Koehler's results 
can be interpreted in other ways, however. For example, it may be that including 
evidence of the random match probability allows the jurors to feel greater confidence 
in the evidence because it is presented to them in a more complete way. This 
confidence could translate into assessments of the probability of guilt that are closer 
to what they should be. In other words, rather than jurors being overimpressed by an 
irrelevant random match probability, it may be that they are underimpressed by a 
match report when the random match information is suppressed or when no 
meaningful guidance is provided in the testimony as to how to combine the random 
match probability with a comparatively large lab error rate. Koehler's analysis does 
not address this because he does not attempt to determine a normative standard-a 
standard that would assess where his subjects ought to come out in the case presented. 
170 E.g., David L. Faigman & A. J. Baglioni, Jr., Bayes' Theorem in the Trial Process: 
Instructing Jurors on the Value of Statistical Evidence, 12 Law & Hum. Behav. 1 
(1~88); Jane Goodman, Jurors' Comprehension and Assessment of Probabilistic 
E~idence, 16 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 361 (1992); Jason Schklar & Shari Seidman 
Diamond, Juror Reactions to DNA Evidence: Errors and Expectancies, 23 Law & 
Hum. Behav. 159 (1999); Brian C. Smith et al., Jurors' Use of Probabilistic Evidence, 
20 Law & Hum. Behav. 49 (1996); William C. Thompson & Edward L. Schumann, 
Interpretation of Statistical Evidence in Criminal Trials: The Prosecutor's Fallacy and 
the Defense Attorney's Fallacy, 11 Law & Hum. Behav.167 (1987). 
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relative to the Bayesian norm.171 Second (a conclusion with consid-
erably less support), no significant reduction in this undervaluation 
results from instruction to jurors, as in the chart format described 
above, about how Bayes' Theorem might apply to the case. 172 
Given Allen and Leiter's skepticism about Bayesian analysis, it 
is not surprising that they do not discuss a body of research that il-
lustrates the value of Bayesian formalism in assessing the use of 
evidence in courts, including the use of Bayesian explanations in 
court. Allen and Leiter might find solace, however, in the second 
of the aforementioned conclusions. It appears to suggest that 
Bayesian instruction does not speak to jurors in a language that 
they can understand or accept. 173 Unfortunately for Allen and Le-
iter, this conclusion is seriously undermined by empirical research 
that I have been conducting over the last two years. In the rest of 
this Section, I summarize a portion of the results of that research. 174 
The data for the study were collected in Kane County, Illinois, 
using the jury pool for that county's criminal court. In one part of 
that research, 542 jurors called for service were given a hypotheti-
cal rape case, the evidence in which was described in writing, and 
were asked both to assess the probability of the defendant's guilt 
m This proposition is supported by each of the studies cited in the previous note. 
172 See Faigman & Baglioni, supra note 170; Smith et al., supra note 170. With regard 
to the effect of using what I have called the likelihood ratio format, one study found 
significant effects on the probability of guilt assessed by subjects but did not attempt a 
comparison to any normative measure of the posterior probability, whether Bayesian 
or otherwise. See Jonathan J. Koehler, On Conveying the Probative Value of DNA 
Evidence: Frequencies, Likelihood Ratios, and Error Rates, 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 859, 
880-83 (1996) (studying, inter alia, a likelihood ratio format that did not also include 
testimony stating or explaining the random match probability itself). 
173 In a possible reference to this body of research, Allen and Leiter comment in a 
footnote: 
[I]t is a complete mystery whether DNA evidence can be incorporated 
algorithmically into trials in a manner that increases the accuracy of decision. 
"Algorithmically" here is an important qualifier. Obviously DNA evidence can 
easily be a primary determinant of the truth of competing stories, but for such a 
purpose no formal analysis of the type discussed here need be employed. 
Allen & Leiter, supra note 1, at 1520 n.94. 
174 The full report is given in Dale A Nance & Scott B. Morris, A Bayesian 
Empirical Assessment of Presentation Formats for Trace Evidence with a Relatively 
Large and Quantifiable Random Match Probability (Aug. 20, 2001) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). It is anticipated that 
this paper will be published in an upcoming issue of Jurimetrics Journal, together with 
other proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Forensic Statistics. 
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and to indicate what verdict they would give in the case. The sub-
jects were randomly divided into five principal experimental 
conditions. Some subjects were given no forensics match evidence. 
Their responses measured the "prior probability" of guilt-the 
probability that would be assessed without the match evidence. In 
each of the other four groups, the match evidence was added but 
presented in one of four different formats. One group was given no 
statistical information relating to the match. Another group was 
given testimony reporting both the random match probability-
given as 4% and explained as "1 in 25"-and a false positive lab er-
ror rate estimate-given as "1 in 1000". In other words, they 
received the statistical evidence in a frequencies format. Another 
group received this information as well as testimony translating the 
four percent random match probability into a 25:1 likelihood ra-
tio-that is, they also received the evidence in the likelihood ratio 
format. 175 Finally, the last group also received instruction in the ef-
fect of a 25:1 likelihood ratio using the chart format provided 
above.176 Two distinct measures of the Bayesian normative likeli-
hood ratio, and corresponding posterior probabilities, were 
calculated from data provided by the subjects regarding their ex-
pectations about the chances of a random match, a laboratory 
error, or some other source of a false positive match report, such as 
witness perjury or mishandling of specimens by the police.177 
175 Id. at 13. Notice that for this experiment, the random match probability reported 
in the testimony is forty times larger than the lab error as so reported. Thus, there was 
no reason to be concerned that the lab error would rationally dominate the random 
match probability. See supra note 169. Also observe that in this variant of the 
likelihood ratio format, the witness does explain the random match probability and 
how it is related to the likelihood ratio, rather than simply stating the ratio itself. Cf. 
Koehler, supra note 172, at 880-81 (presenting results of a study in which only the 
ratio was stated in one condition). 
176 In both the likelihood ratio format and the chart format presentations, the jury 
was reminded that the likelihood ratio of 25:1 does not take into account the risk of 
lab error or of other causes of a false finding or reporting of a match. Because the 
random match probability is so much larger than the testimonial lab error rate, no 
attempt was made to combine the two figures. See supra note 165. 
177 The methodology for articulating a Bayesian norm has improved significantly 
over the last fifteen years. In my study, this important step was performed both with 
and without the assumption that uncontradicted testimony about the random match 
probability and the lab error rate would be accepted by the jury at face value. The two 
values were found to be quite comparable, and the conclusions stated in the text do 
not depend on which measure is chosen. 
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Using the largest and most jury-representative pool of subjects 
so far studied in this connection, the results support the first propo-
sition stated above: that jurors tend to undervalue the evidence of 
the match under all presentation formats examined. The results 
conflict with the second proposition, however. Whereas earlier 
studies had found little or no significant improvements from Bayes-
ian instruction (that is, comparing the chart format to the 
conventional frequencies format), my study found that such in-
struction closed about sixty percent of the gap between the 
assessed probability of guilt and the average of the two Bayesian 
norms, a difference both statistically and practically significant. 
Use of the likelihood ratio format, without the chart-referencing 
explanation, yielded intermediate effects, but the differences did 
not attain statistical significance by conventional standards. 178 
There are, of course, a number of ways that Bayesioskeptics like 
Allen and Leiter might try to reject these results as unhelpful, but I 
will not try to anticipate their responses. 179 My tentative interpreta-
tion of the experimental results is that the quite rational tendency 
of jurors to discount the probative value of technical evidence that 
they do not fully understand is partially offset when the probative 
value of that evidence is clearly illustrated. If this interpretation is 
confirmed by further study, then the Bayesian formalism can serve 
a useful function in trials as well as in the assessment of trials. 
CONCLUSION 
As philosophy, the veritistic approach encouraged by a natural-
ized epistemology is not without its difficulties. To take just one 
interesting example, in the veritism of Professor Goldman, a belief 
178 Further portions of the study assess the extent to which the apparent accuracy 
gain associated with the chart and likelihood ratio formats can be attributed to 
fallacious reasoning by the subjects. The results suggest that the so-called 
"prosecutor's fallacy" identified in previous research, see Thompson & Schumann, 
supra note 170, which might improperly elevate the assessed probability of guilt, did 
not occur to any measurable extent under the chart format, but did occur in about 8% 
of the subjects given evidence under the likelihood ratio format. Some subjects 
succumbed to other fallacies favoring the defense. This accounts in part for the failure 
of subjects' average assessments to reach the Bayesian norm under any format. 
179 Various arguments and replies are assayed in the detailed paper. See Nance & 
Morris, supra note 174. 
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counts as knowledge if "caused by a generally reliable process."180 
That is laudably empirical in the way it directs our attention, pro-
viding a bridge between philosophy and science. But one may well 
ask, how do we know that any of our cognitive processes are reli-
able, when to make such an assessment itself requires some reliable 
cognitive process? Is there not a vicious circularity here? 
What is most interesting, in this context, is the manner in which 
Goldman responds to this concern. In his book, Knowledge in a 
Social World, he devotes several pages to the matter.181 He invites 
us to consider the consequence of multiple sense reports, under 
varying conditions, each reporting the same proposition, such as 
that there is a peach on the table. What ought we to infer from 
such observation reports? He notes that the data are consistent 
with the hypothesis that an evil demon consistently manipulates 
our perceptions so as to fool us into thinking there is a peach on 
the table, but he argues that the prior probability of this explana-
tion is low. He notes that the data are (logically) consistent with 
the hypothesis that sense perceptions might be unsystematically 
unreliable, but argues that the probability of consistent sense re-
ports then becomes steadily smaller as the number of confirming 
reports increases. Finally, he notes the consistency of the data with 
the hypothesis of reliability in the sense perceptions. The astute 
reader will see where this is going. Goldman then applies Bayes' 
Theorem, arguing: 
[A] visual corroboration of vision's first report is more likely on 
the hypothesis that vision is reliable (and both reports are cor-
rect) than it is likely on the hypothesis that vision is 
(unsystematically) unreliable (and both reports are false). 
Again, this is because an unreliable practice is not so likely to 
issue in the same mistaken judgment twice (or three or four 
times). As long as the likelihood of the corroboration is higher 
given the reliability hypothesis than given the (unsystematic) 
unreliability hypothesis, corroboration events provide evidence 
in favor of reliability.182 
180 Allen & Leiter, supra note 1, at 1494 (quoting Alvin I. Goldman, Epistemology 
and Cognition 51 (1986)). 
181 See Goldman, supra note 43, § 3.3, at 83-87. 
182 Id. at 86. 
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Of course, Allen and Leiter can reply that this argument is unre-
lated to their claims about trials since the inference being made is 
that of a philosopher thinking about epistemology rather than a 
jury thinking about a lawsuit. Nonetheless, it is striking how a 
champion of veritism whom Allen and Leiter repeatedly endorse 
uses Bayesian reasoning to support the very foundations of reliabil-
ity in trials-our dependence on the reporting of sense perceptions 
by witnesses.183 My point is simply that it is all too easy to underes-
timate the diversity of ways that such an "algorithmic" approach to 
probabilities can be useful in understanding the problems of infer-
ence at trial. 
In the final analysis, I agree with Allen and Leiter that the ad-
vent of naturalized epistemology is a happy development in 
philosophy, at least from the point of view of those who work in 
the field of evidence law. I agree with Allen and Leiter that phi-
losophical veritism "solidifies the ground beneath their feet." In 
my view, however, this is true not only of the traditional evidence 
scholars. It is also true of those who have pushed the theoretical 
envelope into the domains of expected utility theory and Bayesian 
probability revision. These, too, are legitimate tools in a veritistic 
approach to understanding and improving our trial procedures. 
183 See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 602 (limiting witnesses to testimony about matters about 
which they have "personal knowledge"). 
